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MULTIPLE PUNISHMENTS FOR THE SAME
OFFENSE: THE ANALYSIS AFTER
MISSOURI v. HUNTER
OR
DON QUIXOTE, THE SARG 4SSO SE4, AND THE
GORDIAN KNOT*
GEORGE C. THOMAS III**
* The subtitle is suggested by the rather numerous and colorful metaphors used by the
courts in dealing with this issue. A dissenting judge of the Missouri Supreme Court accused the
majority of appearing like Don Quixote in its effort to avoid the mandate of the United States
Supreme Court. State v. Haggard, 619 S.W.2d 44, 55 (Mo. 1981) (Rendlen, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part), vacated, 103 S.Ct. 1171 (1983).
One of the key cases on the multiple punishment issue is Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333
(1981). In the Albernaz majority opinion, Justice Rehnquist refers to the decisional law in the area
of double jeopardy as "a veritable Sargasso Sea which could not fail to challenge the most intrepid
judicial navigator." Id at 343. The Delaware Supreme Court went so far as to define the
Sargasso Sea in a case that had been vacated and remanded for reconsideration in light of
Albernaz:
The Sargasso Sea is a large oval-shaped area of the North Atlantic Ocean set apart by the
presence of marine plants, or seaweed, which float on its surface-a region of slow ocean
currents surrounded by a boundry of rapidly-moving currents such as the Gulf Stream and
the North Equatorial Current. "The early navigators who sailed their small ships to North
America saw the Sargasso Sea as patches of gulfweed that seemed to form wide-spreading
meadows. Soon there were legends and myths about the region which told of large islands of
thickly matted seaweed inhabited by huge monsters of the deep . . . . They pictured a
blanket of netted seaweed from which no ship could escape, once it became entangled in the
weed ....
Hunter v. State, 430 A.2d 476, 480 n.2 (Del. 1981) (quoting 17 WORLD BOOK ENCYCLOPEDIA 111
(1976)). See also State v. Haggard, 619 S.W.2d 44, 49-50 n.3 (Mo. 1981) (quoting the Hunter v.
State definition of the Sargasso Sea), vacated, 103 S.Ct. 1171 (1983).
Justice Rehnquist argued in dissent in another multiple punishment case that three categories of
.same offense" cases exist and that an earlier case "tied together three separate strands of cases in
what may prove to be a true Gordian knot." Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 702 (1980)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Other colorful metaphors appear in the relevant opinions, and a few will be mentioned in
passing.
** Assistant Professor of Criminal Justice, University of Tennessee at Martin; B.S., Univer-
sity of Tennessee (1968); M.F.A., University of Iowa (1972); J.D., University of Iowa (1975). The
author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Professor Frank W. Miller, Washington Univer-
sity School of Law, in the preparation of this Article. The opinions expressed herein, however, are
solely those of the author.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Substantial confusion exists over the proper role of the double jeop-
ardy clause of the federal constitution' when multiple convictions
based on the same conduct are sought in a single proceeding. The
United States Supreme Court has said several times that the double
jeopardy clause protects against "multiple punishments for the same
offense," 2 but the Court has provided uncertain guidance for determin-
1. "No person shall ... be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or
limb .. " U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
2. E.g., Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 343 (1981); United States v. DiFrancesco,
449 U.S. 117, 129 (1980); Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410, 415 (1980); Whalen v. United States, 445
U.S. 684, 688 (1980); Simpson v. United States, 435 U.S. 6, 11 n.5 (1978); Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S.
161, 165 (1977); United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 343 (1975); North Carolina v. Pearce, 395
[Vol. 62:79
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ing when convictions under different statutes constitute multiple
punishment.3
This lack of clear guidance4 led the Missouri Supreme Court into a
rather unusual conflict with the United States Supreme Court. The
U.S. 711, 717 (1969). See Westen, The Three Faces of Double Jeopardy.- Reflections on Government
Appeals of Criminal Sentences, 78 MICH. L. REv. 1001, 1062 n.211 (1980) (stating that the Court in
Pearce was relying on the analysis in Note, Twice in Jeopardy, 75 YALE L.J. 262, 265-66 (1965),
when it adopted this statement as part of its "favorite saying about double jeopardy").
3. The issue of when convictions under different statutes constitute multiple punishment is
conceptually distinct from the issue of when convictions under a single statute constitute multiple
punishment. The latter issue is a "unit of prosecution" issue and the Supreme Court has resolved
it by seeking to ascertain what the legislative body intended to define as the "unit" of conduct that
would give rise to a violation. See Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 703-04 (1980) (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting). See also Ladner v. United States, 358 U.S. 169 (1958); Bell v. United States,
349 U.S. 81 (1955); United States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218 (1952).
The analysis in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932), is instructive on this matter.
Two multiple punishment issues were presented in Blockburger. The first was whether convic-
tions and consecutive sentences for two sales of narcotics to the same person, as part of the same
agreement, constituted multiple punishment. The Court held that no multiple punishment had
occurred because the statute in question defined each sale as a distinct offense. Id at 302.
The second issue was whether convictions and consecutive sentences for violation of two differ-
ent statutes by the same sale constituted multiple punishment. The Court again held that no
multiple punishment had occurred, but the analysis is markedly different with respect to this issue.
The Court focused on the elements of the statutes and did not refer explicitly to legislative intent.
The rule, the Court wrote, "is that where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two
distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or
only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not." Id at 304.
This, of course, is the Blockburger test. It bears noting that, by definition, it applies only when two
statutes are involved.
4. See. e.g., Schwartz, Multiple Punishment For the "Same Offense" Michigan Grapples With
the Definitional Problem, 25 WAYNE L. REv. 825, 856 (1979) ("The history of the fifth amend-
ment's prohibition against multiple punishment for the same offense has been marked by uncer-
tainty and inconsistency"). See also Westen, supra note 2, at 1063:
Every member of the Court appears to agree that the double jeopardy clause prohibits
multiple punishment. But because they have never collectively focused on the values
that inform the prohibition, they have no common idea as to what the prohibition itself
means; and not knowing what they mean by it, they disagree on its application. So it is,
too, for individual justices. Thus, after announcing three years ago that double punish-
ment meant one thing, Justice Blackmun now admits that it means something quite dif-
ferent. He has changed his position, not because he believes double punishment should
no longer be prohibited, but because he now understands what double punishment has
really meant all along.
Id (footnotes omitted).
The reference to Justice Blackmun's change of position compares Whalen v. United States, 445
U.S. 684, 697-98 (1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment), with Jeffers v. United States,
432 U.S. 132, 155 (1977). InJeffers, Justice Blackmun wrote for the plurality: "If some possibility
exists that the two statutory offenses are the 'same offense' for double jeopardy purposes, however,
it is necessary to examine the problem closely, in order to avoid constitutional multiple-punish-
ment difficulties." 432 U.S. at 155. After concluding that Congress did not intend cumulative
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conflict escalated into a war of wills, won, of course, by the United
States Supreme Court.' The final battle in the war was Missouri v.
Hunter,6 a decision that removed some of the confusion surrounding
the multiple punishment doctrine.
The conflict began in 1980 with Sours v. State. William Scott Sours
was accused of using a gun to hold up a fast food store. He subse-
quently pleaded guilty to the offenses of first degree armed robbery and
using a firearm to commit a felony.8 The trial judge imposed concur-
rent sentences of five years for the robbery and three years for the
penalties, Blackmun noted that "this again makes it unnecessary to reach the lesser-included-
offense issue." Id
In Whalen, Blackmun stated, "dicta in recent opinions of this Court at least have suggested, and
I now think wrongly, that the Double Jeopardy Clause may prevent the imposition of cumulative
punishments in situatiorA in which the Legislative Branch clearly intended that multiple penalties
be imposed for a single criminal transaction." 445 U.S. at 697 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the
judgment) (citing, inter alia, his own plurality opinion in Jeffers, 432 U.S. at 155) (first emphasis
added).
5. The "victory" was not absolute. The Missouri Supreme Court subsequently held that the
action of the United States Supreme Court in vacating some of the state court's decisions did not
change the result in other cases based on that erroneous position. In State v. Thompson, 659
S.W.2d 766 (Mo. 1983), the court ruled that a mandate in a particular case that was based on its
earlier position "cannot and should not be recalled." Id at 769 (plurality opinion). The state had
not petitioned for certiorari in Thompson even though the United States Supreme Court had al-
ready vacated and remanded other cases raising that issue. Id at 770 (Blackmar, J., concurring in
the judgment). This fact was important to the judge who cast the deciding vote in Thompson; in
his view the state "acquiesced in the final disposition of the case" and "[i]t is not necessary to
discuss other possibilities." Id (Blackmar, J., concurring in the judgment).
6. 103 S. Ct. 673 (1983).
7. 593 S.W.2d 208 (Mo.) (SoursI), vacatedsub nom. Missouri v. Sours, 446 U.S. 962 (1980).
8. Id at 210. Sours was convicted of robbery in the first degree by means of a dangerous
and deadly weapon under Mo. REv. STAT. § 560.120 (1969) (current version at Mo. REv. STAT.
§ 569.020 (1978)) and armed criminal action under Mo. REV. STAT. § 559.225(1) (Supp. 1976)
(current version at Mo. REv. STAT. § 571.015(1) (1978)). 593 S.W.2d at 209.
Section 560.120 provided, in pertinent part:
Every person who shall be convicted of feloniously taking the property of another from
his person, or in his presence, or by putting him in fear of some immediate injury to his
person. . . shall be adjudged guilty of robbery in the first degree.
Mo. REv. STAT. § 560.120 (1969) (current version at Mo. REv. STAT. § 569.020 (1978)).
Section 559.225(1) provided, in pertinent part:
[A]ny person who commits any felony under the laws of this state by, with, or through
the use, assistance, or aid of a dangerous or deadly weapon is also guilty of the crime of
armed criminal action and, upon conviction, shall be punished by imprisonment. . . for
a term of not less than three years. The punishment imposed pursuant to this subsection
shall be in addition to any punishment provided by law for the crime committed by,
with, or through the use, assistance, or aid of a dangerous weapon. ...
Mo. REv. STAT. § 559.225(1) (Supp. 1976) (current version at Mo. REv. STAT. § 571.015(1)
(1978)).
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armed criminal action.9 On appeal, the Missouri Supreme Court held
that armed criminal action and first degree armed robbery are the same
offense for purposes of the fifth amendment double jeopardy clause
when both offenses "aris[e] out of the same incident."' 0 Because the
double jeopardy clause prohibits multiple punishment for the same of-
fense," the court vacated one of the convictions. 12
The United States Supreme Court, however, vacated Sours and re-
manded it for reconsideration. 3 Upon reconsideration, the Missouri
Supreme Court reached the same result for the same reasons. 14 There-
after, the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari. 5
Over one hundred Missouri cases were subsequently based on the
Sours interpretation of the double jeopardy clause,' 6 and the United
States Supreme Court routinely vacated and remanded each of these
cases when the state petitioned for certiorari. 7 This forced the Mis-
9. 593 S.W.2d at 210. The trial cou't initially sentenced Sours to consecutive terms, appar-
ently because of the judge's view that the statute required consecutive sentences. But the court
later granted the defendant's motion to vacate the sentences and resentenced him to concurrent
terms. Id
10. Id Two dissents were filed in Sours I. Judge Rendlen argued that the majority had
misapplied the Blockburger test. 593 S.W.2d at 223. Judge Donnelly's rather unusual dissent is
reprmted here in its entirety:
The principal opinion treats the Per Curiam in Harris v. Oklahoma ...as decisive
here.
In my view, we are not bound by general declarations of law made by the United
States Supreme Court. See State v. Clark, 592 S.W.2d 709, 719 (Mo. banc 1979) (Don-
nelly, J., dissenting).
Of course, in a given factual setting, when the United States Supreme Court takes
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties, its adjudication is the law of the case
and its judgment is binding on this Court. But this is not the situation here.
I respectfully dissent.
593 S.W.2d at 223-24 (Donnelly, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
11. See cases cited supra note 2.
12. The question of which conviction to vacate is an interesting one, albeit moot given the
ultimate resolution of the issue. Sours decided that the conviction for the more general offense
(armed criminal action) must be vacated even though that offense would typically be considered
the "greater" offense (it "includes all of the elements of the underlying felony"). 593 S.W.2d at
223. This conclusion was later criticized as an "ad hoc choice. . . without citation of authority or
explication of rationale." State v. Haggard, 619 S.W.2d 44,54 n.3 (Mo. 1981) (Rendlen, J., dissent-
ing), vacated, 103 S. Ct. 1171 (1983).
13, Missouri v. Sours, 446 U.S. 962 (1980). The court ordered reconsideration in light of
Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684 (1980). For a discussion of Wphalen, see infra text accompa-
nying notes 81-89.
14. Sours v. State, 603 S.W.2d 592 (Mo. 1980) (Sours I), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1131 (1981).
15. Missouri v. Sours, 449 U.S. 1131 (1981).
16. Missouri v. Thompson, 659 S.W.2d 766, 774 (Mo. 1983) (Rendlen, C.J., dissenting).
17. Missouri v. Crews, 452 U.S. 957 (1981); Missouri v. Lowery, 452 U.S. 912 (1981); Mis-
Washington University Open Scholarship
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souri Supreme Court once again to consider the Sours issue."8 But
when it did, the Missouri Supreme Court reached the same conclusion
it had reached twice before.' 9
Finally, on January 19, 1983, the United States Supreme Court went
a step further and vacated a Sours case in an opinion that clearly repu-
diated the Missouri Supreme Court's position. Writing for the majority
in Missouri v. Hunter,20 Chief Justice Burger stated that the view of the
Missouri court in Sours and its progeny "manifests a misreading of our
cases on the meaning of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth
Amendment."'" The Chief Justice went on to say that "it is clear that
the Missouri Supreme Court has misperceived the nature of the Double
Jeopardy Clause's protection against multiple punishments." 2
The issue that divided the two courts can be stated as follows: Does
clear legislative authorization of multiple convictions satisfy the prohi-
bition against multiple punishment in a single proceeding? The state
court held that legislative authorization is irrelevant to multiple pun-
ishment analysis. The Supreme Court held that legislative intent is the
key to the analysis.
This Article will trace the development of the multiple punishment
doctrine. It will examine the doctrine as it existed prior to Sours v.
State, the conflict engendered by Sours, and three important Supreme
Court multiple punishment cases decided after Sours. Although some
areas of uncertainty remain, it is this author's position that the multiple
punishment doctrine now has a coherent theoretical basis.
II. THE SUPREME COURT FRAMEWORK FOR MULTIPLE
PUNISHMENT ANALYSIS
One principle that can be initially established is that successive pros-
ecutions for the Missouri offenses of robbery in the first degree and
armed criminal action are forbidden by the double jeopardy clause if
based on the same conduct. This conclusion follows from Harris v.
souri v. Sinclair, 452 U.S. 912 (1981); Missouri v. Greer, 451 U.S. 1013 (1981); Missouri v. Brown,
450 U.S. 1027 (1981); Missouri v. Counselman, 450 U.S. 990 (1981).
18. In view of the number of cases involved, the Missouri Supreme Court consolidated them
and heard all arguments in State v. Haggard, 619 S.W.2d 44 (Mo. 1981), vacated, 103 S. Ct. 1171
(1983).
19. 619 S.W.2d at 49 & n.2.
20. 103 S. Ct. 673 (1983).
21. Id at 677.
22. Id at 678.
[Vol. 62:79
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Oklahoma.23 In Harris, the state based a felony murder conviction on
a death that had occurred during the commission of a robbery. There-
after, the state prosecuted the defendant for the robbery with firearms
that had been proven in the felony murder prosecution. The Supreme
Court held, in a per curiam opinion, that the second prosecution was
forbidden by the double jeopardy clause. The Court wrote: "When as
here, conviction of a greater crime, murder, cannot be had without con-
viction of the lesser crime, robbery with firearms, the Double Jeopardy
Clause bars prosecution for the lesser crime after conviction of the
greater one."
24
The Missouri armed criminal action statute is a perfect analogue to
the offense of felony murder in that both require proof of an underly-
ing felony. 5 Harris said, however, that a person who "has been tried
and convicted for a crime which has various incidents included in it
. . . cannot be a second time tried for one of those incidents without
being twice put in jeopardy for the same offence."2 6 Armed criminal
action and the underlying felony are, therefore, the same offense for
purposes of the double jeopardy clause protection against successive
prosecutions.27
To its credit, the Missouri Supreme Court recognized that this con-
clusion follows inevitably from Harris.28 If armed criminal action and
23. 433 U.S. 682 (1977) (per curiam).
24. Id at 682 (footnote omitted).
25. Mo. REv. STAT. § 571.015(1) (1978) provides that "any person who commits any felony
under the laws of this state by, with, or through the use, assistance, or aid or a dangerous instru-
ment or deadly weapon is also guilty of the crime of armed criminal action." Thus, the state must
prove commission of the underlying felony before it can secure a conviction for armed criminal
action.
26. 433 U.S. at 682, (quoting In re Nielsen, 131 U.S. 176, 188 (1889)).
27. Missouri v. Hunter, 103 S. Ct. 673, 679 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
28. Sours 1, 593 S.W.2d at 218-20. The Michigan Supreme Court had concluded a year
earlier that its felony-firearm statute was not the same offense as the underlying felony because the
state could prove the felony-firearm violation by proving any of a number of underlying felonies.
Wayne County Prosecutor v. Recorder's Court Judge, 406 Mich. 374, 376-77, 280 N.W.2d 793, 799
(1979) (4-3 decision) (alternative holding), appeal dismissed, 444 U.S. 948 (1980). Thus, in the
view of the Michigan court, each offense requires proof of a fact not required by the other (use of
a firearm and the particular felony) and they accordingly satisfy the "required evidence" test
articulated by the Supreme Court in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932). See
supra note 3 for a discussion of the Blockburger test.
Harris, however, repudiates this application of the Blockburger same offense test. A different
felony could have been used to prove felony murder in Harris, but this theoretical difference was
not sufficient to make felony murder a different offense from the underlying felony that was actu-
ally used to prove the felony murder. The state was forbidden by the double jeopardy clause to
Number 1]
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the underlying felony are not the same offense for purposes of the pro-
tection against multiple punishment, as Hunter held, it must be because
the double jeopardy clause applies in a fundamentally different manner
when multiple convictions are sought in a single proceeding.
-1. The Problem of Deciding When Punishments are Multiple
The multiple punishment doctrine protects against "multiple punish-
ments for the same offense."2 9 Thus, it requires two determinations:
are the punishments multiple and are they being imposed for the same
offense? Obviously, if the punishments are not multiple, it is not neces-
sary to reach the sometimes difficult question of whether the offenses
are the same.
At first it might appear that an imposition of separate punishments
under different criminal statutes, as in Sours, constitutes multiple pun-
prosecute both offenses in successive trials. The same result would obtain in a single proceeding if
Blockburger is applied to felony murder and the underlying felony. See infra note 89. With
respect, therefore, to the Missouri armed criminal action statute, "the Missouri courts have prop-
erly recognized that the theoretical possibility that the underlying felony could be some felony
other than first-degree robbery is irrelevant for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause where no
other underlying felony is in fact charged." Missouri v. Hunter, 103 S. Ct. 673, 680 n.2 (1983)
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
Thus, the Missouri Supreme Court was correct in concluding that "[aifter Harris, the applica-
tion given the Blockburger test in Wayne County. . .cannot survive." Sours I, 593 S.W.2d at 220.
Accord Schwartz, supra note 4, at 851 ("The analysis of Harris leads one to the conclusion that
convictions for both the felony-firearm and the underlying felony constitute multiple punishment
for the same offense under the Blockburger test.").
29. Seesupra note 2. It is abundantly clear that the drafters of the fifth amendment intended
to proscribe multiple punishments. The wording of the double jeopardy prohibition proposed by
James Madison in the House of Representatives was as follows: "No person shall be subject,
except in cases of impeachment, to more than one punishment or trial for the same offense." J.
SIGLER, DOUBLE JEOPARDY, THE DEVELOPMENT OF A LEGAL AND SOCIAL POLICY 28 (1969).
This language was adopted by the House of Representatives but was changed in the Senate to the
language that was submitted to and ratified by the states.
Although the actual reason behind the change in language is unknown, id at 31-32, the primary
opposition to Madison's language was that it could be construed to prevent a convicted person
from appealing and setting aside an erroneous conviction. Id at 30. Thus, Sigler concluded, "[i]n
all probability, the drafters of the clause intended to alter Madison's proposal only with a view to
its clarification." Id at 32.
It may be concluded, therefore, that "preventing multiple punishment for the same offense was
foremost in the minds of the framers of the double jeopardy clause." Note, Twice in Jeopardy, 75
YALE LJ. 262, 266 n.13 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Twice in Jeopardy]. See Note, A Defnition of
Punishmentfor Implementing the Double Jeopardy Clause's Mutiple-Punishment Prohibition, 90
YALE L.J. 632, 635 n.16 (1981) [hereinafter cited as 4 Deonition of Punishment]. "Until joinder
became permissible and commonplace, however, multiple punishment could result only from
multiple trials." Twice in Jeopardy, supra, at 266 n.13.
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ishments. If so, the only remaining issue is whether the offenses in
question are the same. Given the conclusion previously reached under
the authority of Harris that armed criminal action is the same offense
as the underlying felony, it would seem that the Missouri Supreme
Court was correct in holding that one of the convictions must be va-
cated. However, the question of whether multiple penalties constitute
multiple punishments is not as easy as it first seems when the legislative
body has explicitly authorized both penalties. After all, what is punish-
ment but what the legislature defines it to be? If the purpose of the
legislature is to punish more severely the defendant who commits rob-
bery with a weapon than the defendant who commits robbery without
using a weapon, it may do so by providing an increased sentence for
robbery committed with a weapon. That type of sentencing provision
is unquestionably a proper exercise of the legislative power to "define
crimes and fix punishments,"3 and is not multiple punishment.3'
30. Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165 (1977).
31. See, e.g., State v. Johnstone, 335 S.W.2d 199 (Mo.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 842 (1960). See
also the hypothetical statute offered for consideration by Justice Frankfurter in Gore v. United
States, 357 U.S. 386, 392-93 (1958):
Suppose Congress, instead of enacting the three provisions before us, had passed an
enactment substantially in this form: "Anyone who sells drugs except from the original
stamped package and who sells such drugs not in pursuance of a written order of the
person to whom the drug is sold, and who does so by way of facilitating the concealment
and sale of drugs knowing the same to have been unlawfully imported, shall be sen-
tenced to not less than fifteen years' imprisonment: Provided, however, That if he makes
such sale in pursuance of a written order of the person to whom the drug is sold he shall
be sentenced to only ten years' imprisonment: Providedfurther, That if he sells such
drugs in the original stamped package he shall also be sentenced to only ten years' im-
prisonment: And providedfurther, That if he sells such drugs in pursuance of a written
order and from a stamped package, he shall be sentenced to only five years' imprison-
ment." Is it conceivable that such a statute would not be within the power of Congress?
And is it rational to find such a statute constitutional but to strike down the Blockburger
doctrine as violative of the double jeopardy clause?
Id This power to fix punishments will even allow the legislature to prescribe more severe penal-
ties for an offender who has previously been convicted of a crime. Habitual offender statutes have
been explicitly upheld as constitutional by the Supreme Court despite challenges based on princi-
ples of double jeopardy, due process, cruel and unusual punishment, equal protection, and the
privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment. See Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S.
728 (1948); Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616 (1912); McDonald v. Massachusetts, 180 U.S.
311 (1901); Moore v. Missouri, 159 U.S. 673 (1895). The rationale behind these decisions is that
the increased penalty "is a stiffened penalty for the latest crime, which is considered to be an
aggravated offense because a repetitive one." Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728, 732 (1948). Thus, it
is not an "additional punishment on crimes for which [the defendant] had already been convicted
and punished." McDonald v. Massachusetts, 180 U.S. 311, 312 (1901). The Supreme Court im-
plicitly affirmed the propriety of such increased sentence statutes in Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S.
263 (1980).
Last term, the Supreme Court held that the eighth amendment requires a criminal sentence to
Washington University Open Scholarship
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The Missouri legislature sought to accomplish the same goal by au-
thorizing two convictions and two penalties for a defendant who com-
mits robbery with a firearm. The issue thus becomes whether there is
any good reason why the Missouri approach constitutes multiple pun-
ishment while the sentence enhancement approach does not. Although
there may be some reasons in support of this position,32 the multiple
penalties under the Missouri statutory scheme are not as obviously
multiple punishments as they first seem.
B. The Genesis of the Multle Punishment Doctrine
Exparte Lange33 was the first case to hold that the double jeopardy
clause prohibits multiple punishments for the same offense?.4  The
criminal statute in Lange prescribed a fine of not more than two hun-
dred dollars or imprisonment for not more than one year.35  Notwith-
standing the disjunctive phrasing of the statute, the trial judge
sentenced the defendant to the maximum fine and the maximum term
of imprisonment. The defendant paid the fine and served five days of
his sentence before his habeas corpus petition was heard. The sentenc-
ing judge entered an order vacating the prior judgment and resen-
tenced the defendant to one year in jail from the date of the
resentencing.36 No provision was made to return the fine to the
be "proportionate to the crime for which the defendant has been convicted." Solem v. Helm, 103
S. Ct. 3001, 3009 (1983). Helm does not, however, impair the conclusion that the double jeopardy
clause is not offended by habitual offender statutes.
32. See infra text accompanying notes 151-60.
33. 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873).
34. Moore v. Illinois, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 13 (1852), seems to assume that multiple punish-
ments are forbidden but does not state the nature of the protection involved. In deciding that
Illinois could constitutionally punish a criminal act that also violated a federal criminal statute,
the Supreme Court noted, "Yet it cannot be truly averred that the offender has been twice pun-
ished for the same offence; but only that by one act he has committed two offences, for each of
which he is justly punishable." Id at 20. Because the next sentence refers to a plea in bar, the
nature of the protection discussed may be the common law plea ofautrefois convict. See generally
Twice in Jeopardy, supra note 29, at 262 n. 1.
The dissent in Moore is more specific, arguing that the state and federal constitutions "all pro-
vide against a second punishment for the same act." 55 U.S. (14 How.) at 22 (McLean, J., dissent-
ing). In any event, however, the statements in Moore are dicta. There was but a single conviction
at issue in Moore. Further, if there had been a conviction under state and federal law, the major-
ity was apparently ready to invoke the dual sovereignty doctrine ultimately adopted in United
States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377 (1922), and affirmed in Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959), and
Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959). See 55 U.S. (14 How.) at 19-20.
35. 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) at 175.
36. Id at 164.
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defendant.37
The judge in Lange thereby effectively sentenced the defendant to
the maximum fine and a term of imprisonment of one year and five
days under a statute that permitted either a fine or imprisonment for
not more than one year. Thus, the defendant in Lange suffered multi-
ple punishment under three theories of multiple punishment. First, his
original sentence was greater than permitted by the disjunctive phras-
ing of the statute. Second, he was sentenced under the same judgment
after he had already fully satisfied one of the alternative penalties pro-
vided for that offense. Third, the effect of both sentences was to impose
a term of imprisonment that exceeded the maximum permitted by the
statute.
Although the Court mentions that the first judgment was "in excess
of the authority of the court,"' 38 and that the defendant faced imprison-
ment for a period in excess of the one year permitted by the statute,39
the thrust of Lange is clearly based on the second theory of multiple
punishment. Noting that the second sentence was erroneous, the Court
went on to state that "it was error because the power to render any
further judgment did not exist."'  Thus, the defendant having fully
executed one of the penalties provided for in the statute, the trial judge
was without authority to sentence him again under the same judgment.
Further, the second theory of multiple punishment underlies an oft-
quoted and eloquent statement in Lange explaining the necessity for a
protection against multiple punishment:
For of what avail is the constitutional protection against more than one
trial if there can be any number of sentences pronounced on the same
verdict? Why is it that, having once been tried and found guilty, he can
never be tried again for that offence? Manifestly it is not the danger or
jeopardy of being a second time found guilty. It is the punishment that
would legally follow the second conviction which is the real danger
guarded against by the Constitution. But if, after judgment has been ren-
dered on the conviction, and the sentence of that judgment executed on
the criminal, he can be again sentenced on that conviction to another and
different punishment, or to endure the same punishment a second time, is
37. The Court assumed the fine could not be paid back to the defendant because the money
had "passed into the Treasury of the United States, and beyond the legal control of the court, or of
anyone else but the Congress of the United States." Id at 175.
38. Id
39. Id
40. Id at 176.
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the constitutional restriction of any value? Is not its intent and its spirit in
such a case as much violated as if a new trial had been had, and on a
second conviction a second punishment inflicted?
The argument seems to us irresistible, and we do not doubt that the
Constitution was designed as much to prevent the criminal from being
twice punished for the same offence as from being twice tried for it.41
Moreover, the facts of Lange implicate the first and third theories of
multiple punishment only if the second sentencing is valid. If the sec-
ond sentence is void, the defendant had executed a sentence of a fine
and five days in jail. No remedy could return the five days in jail to the
defendant, and thus there would be no reason to consider whether,
under the first theory, a defendant could be sentenced to both a fine
and imprisonment. Further, since the resulting sentence in that situa-
tion would obviously be less than the maximum term of imprisonment
permitted by the statute, no issue under the third theory is presented.
Thus, a conclusion that the actions of the trial judge constitute multiple
punishment under the second theory of multiple punishment renders
unnecessary a resolution of the other two theories.4 2 The narrow hold-
ing of Lange is that a judge may not, under the same judgment, resen-
tence a defendant who has fully satisfied a penalty under a statute that
permits only a single penalty.4 3
Lange is a particularly appropriate case with which to begin consid-
eration of the multiple punishments aspect of the multiple punishment
doctrine. No same offense question existed in Lange because the de-
fendant was sentenced twice under the same judgment. Lange, there-
fore, is based solely on whether the defendant suffered multiple
punishments.
North Carolina v. Pearce,' the next Supreme Court case to consider
explicitly the question of when punishments are multiple, was decided
ninety-six years later and represents a rather subtle extension of Lange.
In the companion case to Pearce, Simpson v. Rice, the defendant was
41. Id at 173.
42. The Court reached the third theory by way of dictum, however, assuming that a sentence
for a greater term of imprisonment than permitted by the statute could be corrected during the
term of court in which it was imposed. Id at 174.
43. "[I]f the legislature provides for alternative and exclusive punishments and the defendant
has completely satisfied one of those penalties, the sentencing court may not require the defendant
to suffer the alternative penalty." A Defnition of Punishment, supra note 29, at 639-40 (citing Ex
parte Lange).
44. 395 U.S. 711 (1969) (heard and reported with Simpson v. Rice).
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originally sentenced to prison terms that totalled ten years.45 He suc-
ceeded in obtaining a reversal of his convictions and, upon retrial, was
sentenced to prison terms totalling twenty-five years.46 No credit was
given for the two and one-half years already served.47
Unlike Lange, Rice's second sentencing did not result in a combined
sentence in excess of that permitted by the criminal statute because
state law allowed a total sentence of thirty years.48 Nor had the de-
fendant already executed a judgment that was a full satisfaction of the
penalty permitted by the statute.
Thus, the issue presented by Rice was whether the double jeopardy
clause requires that credit "be given for that part of the original sen-
tence already served. '49 The Court held that it did, contending that in
some situations failure to give credit would produce a total sentence
longer than the maximum penalty permitted by the criminal statute.
The Court reasoned further that, "the same principle obviously holds
true whenever punishment already endured is not fully subtracted from
any new sentence imposed. 50
It is questionable whether that conclusion is quite as obvious as the
Court tells us it is. One could construct a theory of multiple punish-
ment that would require credit be given for time served only to the
extent necessary to limit the total sentence to the maximum permitted
for the offense.5' The Court's view of the multiple punishment doctrine
in Pearce was more expansive, however, and it is necessary to identify
the rationale for the conclusion that credit for time served must always
be given when a defendant is resentenced for the same offense.
The rationale cannot be that the defendant has a vested interest in
the first sentence which operates as a limitation on the second sentence.
The Court clearly held that the double jeopardy clause did not prohibit
a longer sentence upon reconviction if the defendant is given credit for
45. The defendant pleaded guilty to four counts of second-degree burglary and received con-
secutive sentences that totalled ten years. Id at 714 & n.3.
46. Id at7l4n.4.
47. Id at 716.
48. At the retrial, Rice was convicted of three counts of second-degree burglary, and a sen-
tence of ten years could have been imposed on each count. Id at 719 n.14.
49. Id at 716.
50. Id at 718 (footnote omitted).
51. That was the law in Alabama when Rice was resentenced. Id at 716 n.7 (citing Goolsby
v. State, 283 Ala. 269, 215 So. 2d 602 (1968)).
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the time already served."
Nor can the rationale be that the defendant in Rice was sentenced in
excess of what the legislature intended. The maximum sentence al-
lowed by state law was thirty years; the judge could have imposed a
sentence of thirty years and given credit for the two and one-half years
served.5 3 That sentence would have required Rice to serve twenty-
seven and one-half years in addition to his original imprisonment
rather than an additional twenty-five years. Yet the lesser sentence was
found to be in violation of the multiple punishment doctrine.
The only rationale that explains the result in Rice is that serving two
and one-half years of the first sentence entitles Rice to start at that
point in his new sentence. Otherwise, it appears as if he is serving part
of the sentence twice. 4 It follows by analogy from Lange that a judge
cannot explicitly require a defendant to serve part of his sentence twice.
Rice merely holds that what a judge is forbidden to accomplish explic-
itly may not be accomplished indirectly by denying credit for the time
served.
In summary, the multiple punishments aspect of the multiple punish-
ment doctrine, after Lange and Pearce, may be stated as follows: the
trial judge may not impose a sentence greater than that authorized by
the legislative body nor may the judge directly or indirectly require
part of the sentence to be served twice.
The Lange-Pearce rule is thus a limitation on the power of trial
judges to sentence defendants. Neither case dealt with the power of
52. "We hold, therefore that neither the double jeopardy provision nor the Equal Protection
Clause imposes an absolute bar to a more severe sentence upon reconviction." 395 U.S. at 723.
For a critical view of this holding with respect to the double jeopardy clause, see A Deinition of
Punishment, supra note 29, at 636 n.17. The Court in Pearce went on to hold, of course, that the
due process clause bars a more severe sentence upon reconviction unless the trial judge bases the
sentence "upon objective information concerning identifiable conduct on the part of the defendant
occurring after the time of the original sentencing proceeding" and "the factual data upon which
the increased sentence is based [is] made part of the record." 395 U.S. at 726.
53. The Court discussed this possibility after noting that "[i]n most situations, even when
time served under the original sentence is fully taken into account, a judge can still sentence a
defendant to a longer term in prison than was originally imposed." Id at 719 n. 14.
54. This is what the Court meant when it said "if he is reconvicted, those years can and must
be returned-by subtracting them from whatever new sentence is imposed." Id at 719.
Westen and Drubel have reached the same conclusion: "The resulting sentence violated double
jeopardy because, by denying the defendant credit for time already served for the same offense,
the trial judge required him to serve two and a half years of his lawful twenty-five-year sentence
twice." Westen & Drubel, Toward A General Theory Of Double Jeopardy, 1978 Sup. CT. REV.
81, 109.
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legislatures to define punishment. As Justice Stewart noted in a recent
case, if the statute in Lange had allowed a fine and imprisonment, "it
could not be seriously argued that the imposition of both a fine and a
prison sentence in accordance with such a provision constituted an im-
permissible punishment."55
It follows from Lange and Pearce that the issue of when punish-
ments are multiple is initially decided by reference to what punishment
has been authorized by the legislature. The issue left undecided by
Lange and Pearce is the issue presented by Missouri v. Hunter: Does
the multiple punishment doctrine impose a limitation on the power of
the legislature to authorize multiple penalties in a single proceeding?
The Court discussed this issue without deciding it in four cases decided
between 1975 and 1978.
C. Legislative Authorization of Multiple Penalties for the Same
Offense.- The View Prior to Sours v. State
In 1975 the United States Supreme Court began to imply that pun-
ishments are multiple in a constitutional sense only when they exceed
the punishment authorized by the legislature. 6 Under this view, the
question of when punishments are multiple is essentially one of statu-
tory construction.
In Zannelli v. United States,57 the Court stated in dictum that the
function of the Blockburger same offense test, when applied to punish-
ment imposed in a single proceeding, was to "identifly] congressional
intent to impose separate sanctions for multiple offenses arising in the
course of a single act or transaction. '58 The Court also compared the
same offense test to Wharton's Rule,59 characterizing Wharton's Rule
as a "judicial presumption, to be applied in the absence of legislative
intent to the contrary." 6
55. Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 688 (1980).
56. See Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770 (1975). This implication is subject, of course,
to the Rice exception that the sentencing judge may not directly or indirectly require a defendant
to serve part of a presumptively valid sentence twice. See supra notes 44-54 and accompanying
text.
57. 420 U.S. 770 (1975).
58. Id at 785 n.17. The Blockburger test is discussed in more detail supra note 3 and infra
text accompanying notes 110- 1l.
59. Wharton's Rule precludes prosecution of conspiracy to commit certain substantive of-
fenses when those substantive offenses require concerted criminal activity (e.g., adultery). See id
at 782-87.
60. Id at 782.
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The rather clear inference of the Zannelli dicta is that it is unneces-
sary to apply the same offense test if a clear legislative authorization of
multiple penalties exists. In that situation, the punishments would pre-
sumably not be multiple and thus no multiple punishment for the same
offense could occur.
In 1977 the Court again addressed this issue by way of dicta. The
case before the Court, Brown v. Ohio,61 involved an application of the
double jeopardy clause in the context of successive prosecutions for the
same offense and thus did not present a question of when punishments
imposed in a single proceeding might be multiple. The Court discussed
the issue in general terms, however, concluding that "[w]here consecu-
tive sentences are imposed at a single criminal trial, the role of the
[double jeopardy clause] is limited to assuring that the court does not
exceed its legislative authorization by imposing multiple punishments
for the same offense."' 62 According to the Court, the double jeopardy
clause does not limit legislative power to authorize punishment that
would otherwise be multiple because
the Fifth Amendment double jeopardy guarantee serves principally as a
restraint on courts and prosecutors. The legislature remains free under
the Double Jeopardy Clause to define crimes and fix punishments; but
once the legislature has acted courts may not impose more than one pun-
ishment for the same offense and prosecutors ordinarily may not attempt
to secure that punishment in more than one trial.63
Jeffers v. United States'4 gave the Court the opportunity to address
directly the issue of whether a defendant had suffered multiple punish-
ments in violation of the fifth amendment. The Court resolved the
question, however, by deciding that Congress did not intend to author-
ize separate penalties when a single criminal transaction violated the
statutes in question. "The critical inquiry," the Court wrote, "is
whether Congress intended to punish each statutory violation sepa-
rately."6 Having decided that Congress did not intend that result, it
was therefore "unnecessary to reach" the same offense definitional
problem.6
61. 432 U.S. 161 (1977).
62. Id at 165.
63. Id (footnote omitted).
64. 432 U.S. 137 (1977).
65. Id at 155.
66. Id The Court stated it was also unnecessary to reach the issue of whether the concurrent
sentences in .Jeffers constituted multiple punishments. See inra note 192.
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The following year, in Simpson v. United States67 the Court implied
that it had not yet decided the issue of whether the double jeopardy
clause prohibits the imposition of more than one penalty when the leg-
islative body has authorized multiple penalties for a single criminal ac-
tion. The Court addressed the multiple punishment question in
Simpson by stating,
We need not reach the [Blockburger] issue. Before an examination is
made to determine whether cumulative punishments for the two offenses
are constitutionally permissible, it is necessary, following our practice of
avoiding constitutional decisions where possible, to determine whether
Congress intended to subject the defendant to multiple penalties for the
single criminal transaction in which he engaged.68
Deciding that Congress did not intend consecutive sentences for ag-
gravated bank robbery and for using firearms to commit the robbery,69
the Court again found it unnecessary to decide whether the double
jeopardy clause imposed any limitation on legislatively authorized
multiple penalties. The Court's language indicated, however, that this
question was being reserved.
Thus, by 1978, the Court had separated the multiple punishment in-
quiry into two steps. The first step was to ascertain whether Congress
intended to authorize separate penalties when a single criminal transac-
tion violated the criminal statutes in question. If Congress had author-
ized multiple penalties, the next inquiry was whether the offenses were
the same offense. All of the Court's multiple punishment cases to that
point, however, fit neatly into two categories: (1) those in which Con-
gress did not intend to authorize multiple penalites;70 and (2) those in
which the two offenses were not the same offense.71 As a result, the
67. 435 U.S. 6 (1978).
68. Id at 11-12.
69. The Court construed 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) and § 2113(d) (1976). Id
70. E.g., Simpson v. United States, 435 U.S. 6 (1978); Jeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137
(1977); United States v. Gaddis, 424 U.S. 544 (1976); Milanovich v. United States, 365 U.S. 551
(1961); Heflin v. United States, 358 U.S. 415 (1959); Prince v. United States, 352 U.S. 322 (1957).
71. Eg., Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587 (1961); Harris v. United States, 359 U.S. 19
(1959); Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386 (1957); Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1 (1954);
United States v. Michener, 331 U.S. 789 (1947) (per curiam); American Tobacco Company v.
United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946); Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946); Blockburger v.
United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932); Albrecht v. United States, 273 U.S. 1 (1927); Morgan v. De-
vine, 237 U.S. 632 (1915); Carter v. McClaughry, 183 U.S. 365 (1902). Cf. Holiday v. Johnston,
313 U.S. 342, 349 (1941) (stating, in dictum, that "[t]he erroneous imposition of two sentences for a
single offense of which the accused has been convicted, or as to which he has pleaded guilty, does
not constitute double jeopardy").
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Court had not yet faced the question of whether the legislature could, if
it wished, authorize multiple penalties for the same offense. It was this
variation on the multiple punishment theme that was raised by Sours v.
State.
III. THE MISSOURI SUPREME COURT AND THE SouRs DOCTRINE
A. Sours I
As noted earlier in this Article,7" the defendant in Sours pleaded
guilty to first degree armed robbery and armed criminal action based
on the same robbery.73 The legislative intent to authorize penalties
under both statutes was abundantly clear. 4 Noting that the provision
of the Missouri Constitution governing double jeopardy was not appli-
cable in a single prosecution,75 the Missouri Supreme Court proceeded
to resolve the issue under the federal constitution.76 The court framed
the Sours issue as follows: "[W]hether it constitutes double jeopardy to
charge and convict a defendant in a single prosecution with both first
degree robbery by means of a dangerous and deadly weapon and
armed criminal action arising out of the same incident."77
Relying principally on Harris, as well as on negative inferences from
Simpson and Jeffers, the state court concluded that the two offenses
were the same offense for purposes of the double jeopardy clause. Not-
ing that the clause "prohibits double punishments for the same of-
72. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
73. Sours 1, 593 S.W.2d at 210.
74. The relevant language of the armed criminal action statute is as follows: "The punish-
ment imposed pursuant to this subsection shall be in addition to any punishment provided by law
for the crime committed by, with, or through the use, assistance, or aid of a dangerous or deadly
weapon." Mo. REv. STAT. § 571.015(1) (1978).
75. The Missouri Constitution prohibits the state from placing a person "again in jeopardy of
life or liberty for the same offense, after being once acquitted by a jury." Mo. CONsT. art. 1, § 19.
It was the court's opinion that "[s]ince the convictions from which appellant seeks relief were
obtained in a single prosecution, Mo. CoNsT. art. I, § 19 does not apply in this case." Sours I, 593
S.W.2d at 211. The court also noted that it was not free to construe the armed criminal action
statute as a sentence enhancement statute. Id. at 221-22 n.10. The Tennessee Supreme Court
construed its felony firearm statute in that manner in order to avoid what it perceived to be a
double jeopardy violation. State v. Hudson, 562 S.W.2d 416 (Tenn. 1978). See also Schwartz,
supra note 4, at 853.
76. See supra note I. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969), held the fifth amendment
double jeopardy clause applicable to the states as a part of the fourteenth amendment due process
clause.
77. Sours 1, 593 S.W.2d at 210.
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fense,"' 8 the court assumed that the same offense determination
resolved the issue and set aside one of the convictions.79 The court did
not consider whether clear legislative authorization for both penalties
might negate the conclusion that the punishments are multiple.8 0
The United States Supreme Court was obviously dissatisfied with the
Sours analysis. The Court vacated Sours and remanded it for recon-
sideration in light of Whalen v. United States,8 ' a case that was decided
after the state court had decided Sours. 2
. Whalen v. United States
The issue in Wfhalen was whether the double jeopardy clause prohib-
ited the imposition of consecutive sentences in a single proceeding for
rape and for felony murder based on the death of the rape victim. As
in Harris, the Court was faced with convictions for felony murder and
for the underlying felony. It would seem that if the double jeopardy
clause prohibits multiple punishment for the same offense in the same
manner as it prohibits successive prosecutions, the Court could simply
have cited Harris and reversed the lower courts.
The Court, however, "eschew[ed] reliance upon Harris v.
78. Id at 211.
79. See supra note 12.
80. Cf. Wayne County Prosecutor v. Recorder's Court Judge, 406 Mich. 374, 280 N.W.2d 793
(1979) (holding the multiple punishment doctrine, as amplified by Brown and Zannelli, only pro-
hibits imposition of a greater punishment than the legislature intended and that separate convic-
tions and consecutive sentences under the Michigan felony firearm statute were therefore
permissible) (4-3 decision) (alternative holding), appeal dismissed, 444 U.S. 948 (1980). See supra
note 28 for a discussion of the other basis for Wayne County.
At least one commentator shared the view of the Missouri Supreme Court that legislative au-
thorization of multiple penalties does not change the constitutional analysis.
The legislative deference approach cannot be reconciled with the opinions in Jeffers
and the analytical framework set forth in Simpson. Although not dealing directly with
the question under consideration here [application of Michigan's felony firearm statute],
these cases illustrate the proper manner for approaching the felony-firearm statute's
double jeopardy problem. As Simpson illustrates, the double jeopardy question may be
avoided when there is no legislative intent to cumulate punishment. When the legisla-
ture intended double punishment, however, as under the Michigan felony-firearm stat-
ute, the double jeopardy issue cannot be avoided. In that case, as Jeffers illustrates, the
Blockburger test, not the legislative intent, determines whether the two convictions con-
stitute multiple punishment for the same offense.
Schwartz, supra note 4, at 847-48.
81. 445 U.S. 684 (1980).
82. Sours I was decided January 15, 1980, and a rehearing was denied on February 18, 1980.
Whalen was decided April 16, 1980.
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Oklahoma,"83 instead devoting most of its analysis to the issue of
whether Congress intended to authorize cumulative punishments for
rape and for felony murder based upon the rape. The constitutional
claim, the Court noted, "cannot be separated entirely from a resolution
of the question of statutory construction." 84
The Court acknowledged that the double jeopardy clause protects
"against multiple punishments for the same offense,"85 but stated that
"the question whether punishments imposed by a court after a defend-
ant's conviction upon criminal charges are unconstitutionally multiple
cannot be resolved without determining what punishments the Legisla-
tive Branch has authorized."86 Although this language is ambiguous,
one inference that may be drawn from it is that punishments are not
multiple if they are authorized by the legislature.87 Indeed, four mem-
bers of the Whalen Court made it clear, in separate opinions, that they
viewed the multiple punishments issue purely as a function of legisla-
tive intent.88
Seven members of the Whalen Court, however, found that the legis-
lature did not intend to authorize consecutive sentences for rape and
for felony murder based upon the rape.89 Thus, the Court was again
83. 445 U.S. at 701 (Rebnquist, J., dissenting).
84. Id. at 688.
85. Id (quoting North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969)). See cases cited supra at
note 2.
86. 445 U.S. at 688.
87. The author of the Whalen majority opinion, Justice Stewart, later rejected this inference
in his separate opinion in Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333 (1981): "No matter how clearly
it spoke, Congress could not constitutionally provide for cumulative punishments unless each stat-
utory offense required proof of a fact that the other did not, under the criterion of Blockburger v.
United States." 450 U.S. at 345. (Citation omitted).
Apparently, Justice Stewart intended the quoted language in Whalen to mean that a court must
first resolve the issue of legislative intent and would reach the constitutional same offense issue
only if the legislature had authorized cumulative penalties.
88. See 445 U.S. at 696 (White, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) ("the
question is one of statutory construction and does not implicate the Double Jeopardy Clause"); id.
at 697 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment) ("[t]he only function the Double Jeopardy
Clause serves in cases challenging multiple punishments is to prevent the prosecutor from bring-
ing more charges, and the sentencing court from imposing greater punishments, than the Legisla-
tive Branch intended") (emphasis in original); id at 707 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting, joined by
Burger, C.J.) ("the question before us is purely one of statutory interpretation").
89. Five members joined the majority opinion. Justices White and Blackmun agreed in sepa-
rate opinions that Congress did not intend to authorize cumulative penalties. This conclusion was
based on an application of the Blockburger test. Although the government argued that felony
murder and the underlying felony are not the same offense under the Blockburger test, the Court
disagreed: "In the present case. . . proof of rape is a necessary element of proof of the felony
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol62/iss1/3
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not faced with the issue of whether the legislative body could, if it
wished, authorize multiple punishments for the same offense.
C. Sours II
The holding of Whalen was not dispositive on the Sours issue.9"
Whalen, after all, held that Congress did not intend consecutive
sentences for the offenses in question. But the Missouri legislature had
made very clear its intent to authorize multiple penalties in the context
of armed criminal action convictions. 9' Thus, the Missouri Supreme
Court seemed somewhat perplexed by the remand for reconsideration
in light of Whalen. "Clearly," the state court wrote, "the five justices
who joined in the opinion of the Court in Whalen. . . declined Justice
Blackmun's invitation [in his separate opinion] to hold that the ques-
tion of what punishments are constitutionally permissible can be re-
duced to the question of what punishment the legislature intended to
be imposed." 92
Because the Missouri Supreme Court explicitly refused to "collapse
the constitutional question into the question of legislative intent," 93 the
court was forced to "bite the bullet and meet the federal constitutional
murder, and we are unpersuaded that this case should be treated differently from other cases in
which one criminal offense requires proof of every element of another offense." Id at 694. Jus-
tices White and Blackmun agreed with this conclusion. Id at 696 & 698.
90. But see State v. Thompson, 659 S.W.2d 766, 773 (Mo. 1983) (Rendlen, C.J., dissenting)
(concluding that Whalen was sufficiently clear so that the defendant could have expected his
armed criminal action sentence to be altered "only in the first four months of 1980 (between Sours
I and Whalen)").
91. See supra note 74.
92. Sours 11, 603 S.W.2d at 595 (Mo. 1980), cert. denied 449 U.S. 1131 (1981). The reference
to "Justice Blackmun's invitation" is to his concurring opinion in Whalen. He argued that the
multiple punishment doctrine serves only to prohibit greater punishments "than the Legislative
Branch intended." 445 U.S. at 697 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment).
93. Sours 11, 603 S.W.2d at 595 n.3. Another unusual metaphor can be found in this
footnote:
Our refusal to collapse the constitutional question into the question of legislative in-
tent does not commit us to the assumption, criticized by Mr. Justice Rehnquist, "that any
particular criminal transaction is made up of a determinable number of constitutional
atoms that the legislature cannot further subdivide into separate offenses." See Whalen,
445 U.S. at 701, 100 S. Ct. at 1443 (Mr. Justice Rehnquist, dissenting). On the contrary,
we recognize that the legislature may divide the criminal transaction into its subatomic
particles, into protons and neutrons and electrons, into particles of different electrical
charges and weights and spins. We hold only that, once the definition of a crime is fixed
as a configuration of such elements, the state may not, consistently with the due process
clause and the double jeopardy clause, impose separate punishments both for the neu-
tron and for the atom of which it is a part.
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issue." 94 The court began by reiterating its view that the two offenses
in question are the same offense for purposes of successive prosecu-
tions.95 Reasoning that the protection offered by the double jeopardy
clause is against "punishing a person twice for the same offense," 96 the
court concluded that it does not matter whether the punishments are
obtained in one proceeding or in successive trials. If the punishments
are for the same offense, only one is permissible under the fifth
amendment.
Still obviously troubled by the remand for reconsideration in light of
Whalen, the Missouri Supreme Court appeared somewhat defiant
when, near the end of the Sours II majority opinion, it stated:
If the vacation of our prior judgment and the remand of the case for
reconsideration in light of Whalen was intended to lead this Court to
adopt the view that the General Assembly is free to impose separate pun-
ishments for two crimes that constitute the same offense under the tradi-
tional same evidence test, we are unable to so read Whalen and we are not
prepared to take that step. We believe that the United States Supreme
Court has heretofore reserved that question as noted above. We believe
that such a ruling would abolish the traditional double jeopardy protec-
tion against multiple punishments for the same offense. It would require
bifurcation of the meaning of "same offense" under the double jeopardy
clause. It would grant to the state legislature the power to define the
meaning of "same offense" as used in the double jeopardy clause of the
Constitution, a traditional judicial function. The implicit effect of such a
holding would be that the double jeopardy clause would hereafter be only
a limitation on the executive and judicial branches, but not on the legisla-
tive branch of government. We do not believe that it is appropriate for
this Court to make such a ruling. If such a ruling is to be made, it is the
responsibility of the United States Supreme Court to make it.9
7
Judge Rendlen's dissent in Sours I1 presented the contrary argument
in clear, forceful terms.98 He argued that the original purpose of the
double jeopardy clause was to prevent reprosecutions99 and that the
94. Id at 603 (footnote omitted).
95. Id at 604-06.
96. Id at 603.
97. Id at 606.
98. Id at 607 (Rendlen, J., dissenting). Judge Donnelly also dissented, id at 606 (Donnelly,
J., dissenting), on essentially the same grounds, and he joined Judge Rendlen's dissent.
99. Judge Rendlen's dissent quotes, but does not comment on, the original wording of the
double jeopardy clause as submitted by James Madison. Id at 608 n.4 (Rendlen, J., dissenting).
See supra note 29 for a discussion of the history of the ratification of the double jeopardy clause,
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only conceivable function of a double punishment doctrine is to pre-
vent punishment in excess of what the legislature intended. Judge Ren-
dlen reasoned that inasmuch as the legislature could punish a robber
armed with a firearm more severely by a sentence enhancement provi-
sion, it should be allowed to accomplish the same result by authorizing
a conviction for the use of the firearm in addition to the conviction for
the robbery. To argue otherwise "employs an intellectual artifice pro-
viding the criminal defendant little or no additional protection."'1°°
The dissent reasoned further that the multiple punishment doctrine
is not designed to guard against legislative excesses, but rather to guard
against "prosecutorial and judicial arbitrariness." '' Under the armed
criminal action statute, however, virtually no chance exists for
prosecutorial and judicial arbitrariness because the legislative intent is
clear. The dissent thus concluded that "no issue of constitutional di-
mension arises under the Fifth Amendment by the operation of our
Missouri armed criminal action statute."'10 2  Without a constitutional
basis for its action, the majority decision abridged the legislature's
power to define crimes and dictate punishment, conferring "upon
courts a role neither contemplated by those who ratified the Fifth
Amendment nor supported by subsequent Supreme Court decisions in-
terpreting it.' 10 3
By a vote of five to two, however, the Missouri Supreme Court re-
fused to change the position it had taken in Sours I, and the state peti-
concluding that its primary purpose was to prevent multiple punishment for the same offense.
This conclusion does not, unfortunately, shed any light on how to define "punishment" for the
purpose of implementing the prohibition against multiple punishment.
The problem of multiple penalties based on overlapping criminal statutes violated by the same
conduct probably did not occur to those who drafted and ratified the double jeopardy clause. As
Judge Rendlen pointed out in his dissent, only a "limited number of common law felonies" ex-
isted at the time of the adoption of the fifth amendment. 603 S.W.2d at 608 (Rendlen, J., dissent-
ing). The "proliferation of complex statutory crimes" is responsible for the imposition of multiple
penalties based on the same act and thus is responsible for the challenges to these penalties under
the double jeopardy clause. Id (Rendlen, J., dissenting).
100. Id at 609 (Rendlen, J., dissenting).
101. Id at 611 (Rendlen, J., dissenting).
102. Id (Rendlen, J., dissenting).
103. Id at 614 (Rendlen, J., dissenting). Judge Rendlen went on to quote Justice Frankfurter:
"In effect, we are asked to enter the domain of penology, and more particularly that tantalizing
aspect of it, the proper apportionment of punishment. Whatever views may be entertained regard-
ing seventy of punishment, whether one believes in its efficacy or its futility, these are peculiarly
questions of legislative policy." Id (Rendlen, J., dissenting) (quoting Gore v. United States, 357
U.S. 386, 393 (1958) (citation omitted)).
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tioned for certiorari in Sours II. The procedural machinations
surrounding the Sours case were beginning to resemble a tennis match
and, viewed in that light, Sours I" returned the ball to the United
States Supreme Court.
The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari.' °4 On the sur-
face, this action appears surprising, but it can be explained on grounds
other than that the Court accepted the state court's interpretation of the
double jeopardy clause. 05 Regardless of the reasons behind the denial
of certiorari, the Court soon made it very clear that it intended to pur-
sue the Sours issue. Between March 23 and June 22, 1981, the Court
vacated and remanded nineteen Missouri cases"0 6 for "further consid-
104. Missouri v. Sours, 449 U.S. 1131 (1981).
105. Two of the strongest proponents of the "legislative intent" theory of multiple punishment
voted to deny certiorari on the ground that the petition had become moot. Three of the remaining
justices had expressed opposition to the "legislative intent" theory of multiple punishment. Al-
bernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 345 (1981) (Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment, joined
by Marshall and Stevens, J.J.) ("Congress could not constitutionally provide for cumulative pun-
ishments" for offenses that fail to meet the .Blockburger test). The four remaining justices seem-
ingly wanted to give the Missouri Supreme Court another chance to reach the "right" result before
flatly reversing the state court.
106. See supra note 17. The following cases were vacated and remanded: State v. (Rollan
Anthony) Williams, 606 S.W.2d 777 (Mo. 1980), vacated sub nom. Missouri v. Greer, 451 U.S.
1013 (1981); State v. Kendrick, 606 S.W.2d 643 (Mo. 1980), vacatedsub noma. Missouri v. Greer,
451 U.S. 1013 (1981); State v. (Donald) Greer, 605 S.W.2d 93 (Mo. 1980), vacatedsub nora. Mis-
souri v. Greer, 451 U.S. 1013 (1981); State v. Sours, 593 S.W.2d 208 (Mo.) (Sours I), vacaledsub
non Missouri v. Sours, 446 U.S. 962 (1980); State v. White, 610 S.W.2d 646 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980),
vacatedsub noma. Missouri v. Counselman, 450 U.S. 990 (1981); State v. (Johnny) Williams, 610
S.W.2d 644 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980), vacatedsub noma. Missouri v. Counselman, 450 U.S. 990 (1981);
State v. Martin, 610 S.W.2d 18 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980), vacatedsub nom. Missouri v. Brown, 450 U.S.
1027 (1981); State v. (Eddie) Greer, 609 S.W.2d 423 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980), vacatedsub nora. Mis-
souri v. Brown, 450 U.S. 1027 (1981); State v. Hawkins, 608 S.W.2d 496 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980),
vacatedsub noma. Missouri v. Brown, 450 U.S. 1027 (1981); State v. Lowery, 608 S.W.2d 445 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1980), vacatedsub noan. Missouri v. Lowery, 452 U.S. 912 (1981); State v. Payne, 607
S.W.2d 822 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980), vacatedsub noma. Missouri v. Counselman, 450 U.S. 990 (1981);
State v. Tunstall, 607 S.W.2d 809 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980), vacatedsub noma. Missouri v. Crews, 452
U.S. 957 (1981); Brown v. State, 607 S.W.2d 801 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980), vacatedsub noma. Missouri
v. Brown, 450 U.S. 1027 (1981); State v. Collins, 607 S.W.2d 781 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980), vacated sub
noma. Missouri v. Brown, 450 U.S. 1027 (1981); State v. Helton, 607 S.W.2d 772 (Mo. Ct. App.
1980), vacated sub noma. Missouri v. Crews, 452 U.S. 957 (1981); State v. (Timothy) Crews, 607
S.W.2d 759 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980), vacatedsub noma. Missouri v. Crews, 452 U.S. 957 (1981); State v.
(Terry) Crews, 607 S.W.2d 729 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980), vacatedsub noa. Missouri v. Crews, 452 U.S.
957 (1981); State v. Sinclair, 606 S.W.2d 271 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980), vacatedsub nam. Missouri v.
Sinclair, 452 U.S. 912 (1981); State v. Counselman, 603 S.W.2d 3 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980), vacatedsub
noa. Missouri v. Counselman, 450 U.S. 990 (1981); State v. McGee, 602 S.W.2d 709 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1980), vacatedsub noma. Missouri v. Counselman, 450 U.S. 990 (1981).
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eration in light of 4lbernaz v. United States."' 7
D. Albernaz v. United States
Although the holding in Albernaz, like the holding in Whalen, does
not reach the issue presented by Missouri's armed criminal action stat-
ute, the dicta is clear and leaves little doubt about the view of a major-
ity of the Court on the issue.
The issue directly presented by Albernaz was whether the double
jeopardy clause was offended by convictions and consecutive sentences
for conspiracy both to import and distribute marijuana when both vio-
lations are based on the same agreement.' °8 The majority opinion,
joined by six members of the Court, held that Congress "intended to
permit the imposition of consecutive sentences for violations of both
statutes." 0 9 In reaching this conclusion, the Court looked primarily to
the test it had articulated half a century earlier in Blockburger: "where
the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statu-
tory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are
two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a
fact which the other does not."' 10
The Court applied the Blockburger test to the statutes in question
and found that they satisfied the test. Each offense required proof of a
fact that the other did not (intent to distribute and intent to import).
Significantly, however, that was not the end of the analysis in41bernaz.
The Court noted that, in the context of multiple punishment analysis,
the Blockburger test is a "means of discerning congressional purpose
[and] the rule should not be controlling where, for example, there is a
clear indication of contrary legislative intent.""' No indication of con-
trary legislative intent appeared in the legislative history of the statutes
under consideration, however, and the result of the Blockburger test
was accepted as sufficient proof of congressional intent. Because the
107. 450 U.S. 333 (1981).
108. The defendant was convicted under 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 963 (1976).
109. 450 U.S. at 343.
110. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932). See supra note 3 for a discussion
of Blockburger.
111. 450 U.S. at 340. The Blockburger test is more than a tool of statutory construction in the
context of successive prosecutions. Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161 (1977), held that the Blockburger
test defined the minimum standard for evaluating whether successive prosecutions are for the
same offense. Accord Missouri v. Hunter, 103 S. Ct. 673, 682 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting);
Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410, 419-20 (1980).
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statutes satisfied Blockburger, consecutive sentences were therefore
permissible.
It was clear by this point in the opinion, that legislative intent can
override the Blockburger test. But the Court made its view even clearer
in the last paragraph of the majority opinion: "the question of what
punishments are constitutionally permissible is not different from the
question of what punishment the Legislative Branch intended to be im-
posed. Where Congress intended, as it did here, to impose multiple
punishment, imposition of such sentences does not violate the
Constitution."' 12
Any uncertainty about the meaning of this dicta is dispelled by the
separate concurring opinion of Justice Stewart, the author of Whalen.
Stewart's opinion, joined by Justices Marshall and Stevens, forcefully
takes issue with the way the majority read the Whalen dicta, and sin-
gled out the two sentences quoted in the previous paragraph for criti-
cism: "These statements are supported by neither precedent nor
reasoning and are unnecessary to reach the Court's conclusion."'1 13
Justice Stewart's opinion explicitly rejected the majority's theory of
the role of the double jeopardy clause in a multiple punishment con-
text: "No matter how clearly it spoke, Congress could not constitution-
ally provide for cumulative punishments unless each statutory offense
required proof of a fact that the other did not, under the criterion of
Blockburger v. United States."' 14
Given the clarity of the battle lines drawn in Albernaz, the Court's
action in remanding state court decisions in light of Albernaz gave
lower courts a rather clear idea of the proper resolution of the issue.
The Delaware Supreme Court, for example, in considering anAlbernaz
remand of one of its decisions, remarked that "[a]lthough dicta, the
emergence of the evolving rule stands unmistakably clear by virtue of
the vote of 6 to 3, cast in the face of the fiat contradiction of the concur-
ring Justices, including the author of Whalen."' 5 The Delaware court
reversed its earlier decision and followed, albeit "reluctantly," what it
perceived to be the "evolving rule" as articulated in Albernaz.116 The
court held that where the legislature intended "to impose multiple pun-
112. 450 U.S. at 344.
113. Id at 345 (Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment).
114. Id (Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment) (citation omitted).
115. Hunter v. Delaware, 430 A.2d 476, 481 (1981) (Hunter H1).
116. Id
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ishments for two offenses not satisfying the Blockburger test, imposition
of two consecutive sentences by a court as a result of a single criminal
trial does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth
Amendment." 7 1
The Missouri Supreme Court did not give up that easily. In State v.
Haggard,18 the Court noted that Albernaz involved two offenses that
were different under the Blockburger test. Thus, the precise issue
presented by Sours and its progeny was not settled by Albernaz. Re-
marking that it understood the "seeming desperation" of The Delaware
Supreme Court,"19 the Missouri court reaffirmed its Sours holding and
stated that it would not follow Albernaz "[u]ntil such time as the
Supreme Court of the United States declares clearly and unequivocally
that the Double Jeopardy Clause. . . does not apply to the legislative
branch of government."' 20
Seeking to bolster its conclusion, the Missouri court read the denial
of certiorari in Sours II as evidence that "a large majority of the
United States Supreme Court tacitly, if not in fact, sustained our posi-
tion as stated in Sours II.'' Not only is that reading of the denial of
certiorari questionable as a factual matter,122 but, as the dissent in Hag-
gard correctly observed, "denial of review on certiorari neither imports
a decision on the merits of the opinion below, nor forecloses subse-
quent consideration of the issues determined therein."' 23
The dissent in Haggard compared the majority's reliance on the de-
nial of certiorari in Sours II with "Quixana's Don Quixote de la
Mancha's search for giants that became a comic tilt with windmills."' 24
The dissent urged that "we have reached the point where this court
must honor the 'rule of supremacy' and gracefully accept the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the organic law embodied in the Constitution
of the United States."'12
5
117. Id
118. 619 S.W.2d 44 (Mo. 1981), vacated, 103 S. Ct. 1171 (1983).
119. Id at 50.
120. Id at 51.
121. Id
122. See supra note 105.
123. 619 S.W.2d at 56 (Rendlen, J., dissenting).
124. Id at 55 (Rendlen, J., dissenting).
125. Id at 56 (Rendlen, J., dissenting).
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E. A New Theory
After a new Missouri Criminal Code became effective on January 1,
1979, a new element appeared in the Sours analysis. In State ex rel.
Wes/fall v. Ruddy126 the issue was whether the state could charge both
armed criminal action and the underlying felony if the judge instructs
the jury that it may convict for only one of the offenses. The state
supreme court held this permissible after stating that the lesser in-
cluded offense statute in the new criminal code acted to bar dual con-
victions for armed criminal action and the underlying felony.'27
The court's statutory analysis was that the criminal code prohibits
convictions for a greater and lesser included offense;'28 because armed
criminal action requires proof of an underlying felony, the latter of-
fense is a lesser included offense of the former. Ruddy thereby intro-
duced a statutory basis for the Missouri Supreme Court's position on
the Sours issue.
It is debatable whether the Missouri legislature meant the general
language of the lesser included offense provision of the criminal code to
prevail over very specific langauge authorizing separate penalties for
armed criminal action and the underlying felony. In his Ruddy dissent,
Chief Judge Donnelly termed the volunteered conclusion of the major-
ity "extremely unfortunate."' 2 9 Judge Rendlen, in a separate dissent,
wrote, "in an attempt to evade the impact of Albernaz v. United States
and to fortify their notion of double jeopardy, the majority have en-
grafted an erroneous statutory interpretation of Missouri's new Crimi-
nal Code as an issue in this cause."' ' 31
It makes little difference who was right in Ruddy. The Missouri leg-
islature soon removed all doubt about its intent.
. A New Player
The Missouri General Assembly entered the fray in 1982 to clarify
further its intent concerning penalties for armed criminal action and
the underlying felony. It enacted a provision prohibiting application of
any law that prevents imposition of sentences for both armed criminal
126. 621 S.W.2d 42 (Mo. 1981).
127. Id at 45.
128. Mo. Rav. STAT. § 556.041(l) (1978). Included offenses are defined in Mo. Rav. STAT.
§ 556.046 (1978).
129. 621 S.W.2d at 47 (Donnelly, C.J., dissenting).
130. Id (Rendlen, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
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action and the underlying felony when both sentences are permitted by
the armed criminal action statute.131 This provision obviously prevents
application of the lesser included offense statute to bar dual convictions
for armed criminal actions and an underlying felony. Thus, the Ruddy
analysis had a very short life.
IV. MIssouRi V HUNTER: SOME CONFUSION CLEARS
After detailing the procedural history of the Sours issue, the United
States Supreme Court began its analysis in Missouri v. Hunter13 2 by
responding to the way the Missouri Supreme Court characterized the
issue in Haggard. The Court noted the state court's remark that it
would hold firm to its Sours analysis until the United States Supreme
Court "declares clearly and unequivocally" that the double jeopardy
clause "does not apply to the legislative branch of government."'
' 33
Commenting that " [t]his view manifests a misreading of our cases,"
the Supreme Court observed that "we need hardly go so far as sug-
gested to decide that a legislature constitutionally can prescribe cumu-
lative punishments for violation of its first degree robbery statute and
its armed criminal action statute."'1
34
The Court is clearly correct in its conclusion that the Missouri court
was exaggerating the issue underlying Hunter. To state that the multi-
ple punishments aspect of the double jeopardy protection is ultimately
controlled by legislative intent is not to say that the double jeopardy
clause does not apply to the legislative branch of government. The
double jeopardy clause would still impose three important limitations
on the legislature, two of which are related in a manner that is not yet
completely clear.
The first limitation which can be inferred from the Supreme Court
same offense cases is that the double jeopardy clause applies rigidly to
successive prosecutions. No decision has even hinted that this protec-
tion could be impaired by legislative action. In fact, recent cases have
131. Mo. REv. STAT. § 571.017 (Supp. 1982).
132. 103 S. Ct. 673 (1983).
133. Id at 677 (quoting State v. Haggard, 619 S.W.2d 44, 51 (Mo. 1981), vacated, 103 S. Ct.
1171 (1983)). The same argument has been made by one commentator. See Schwartz, supra note
4, at 844 n.120 ("The only limitations upon the legislature under this [legislative deference] ap-
proach would be the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment and the due process
clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution.") (citations to
Constitution omitted).
134. 103 S. Ct. at 677.
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expanded the definition of same offense in the context of successive
prosecutions, 35 making it highly unlikely that the Court will subject
this aspect of the double jeopardy clause to legislative veto.
The second legislative limitation which still operates after Hunter is
somewhat more nebulous. It is the rule of lenity. t36 When it applies,
the rule of lenity raises a presumption against turning a "single transac-
tion into multiple offenses."' 37 It is triggered by manifestations of con-
gressional intent to punish a certain course of conduct rather than each
component of that conduct. 38 When faced with the possibility that
Congress did not intend separate penalties to attach to a course of con-
135. See, e.g., Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410 (1980) (dictum) (suggesting that a second prose-
cution is barred by the double jeopardy clause in some situations even if the Blockburger test is
met); Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 166-67 n.6 (1977) ("[elven if two offenses are sufficiently differ-
ent to permit the imposition of consecutive sentences, successive prosecutions will be barred in
some circumstances where the second prosecution requires the relitigation of factual issues already
resolved by the first") (dictum).
136. "It may fairly be said to be a presupposition of our law to resolve doubts in the enforce-
ment of a penal code against the imposition of a harsher punishment." Bell v. United States, 349
U.S. 81, 83 (1955).
137. Id at 84.
138. See, e.g., Simpson v. United States, 435 U.S. 6 (1978) (intent to be lenient demonstrated
by a statement offered on the floor of the House of Representatives); Milanovich v. United States,
365 U.S. 551 (1961) (offenses came into law at different times and the offenses-receiving stolen
property and larceny-had long been considered mutually exclusive); Heflin v. United States, 358
U.S. 415 (1959) (language in Senate and House Reports raised an inference that Congress in-
tended to broaden coverage of the Federal Bank Robbery Act to include offenders who receive
stolen property from the robbers rather than to authorize cumulative punishments for the bank
robbers themselves); Prince v. United States, 352 U.S. 322 (1957) (letter from Attorney General
asking Congress to broaden the coverage of the bank robbery statute held sufficient to find lack of
congressional intent to authorize cumulative penalties for robbery and for entering a bank with
the intent to rob).
Simpson v. United States, 435 U.S. 6 (1978) is illustrative of how the Court has applied the rule
of lenity. The defendant's conduct in Simpson constituted both armed robbery, under 18 U.S.C.
§ 2113(d) (1982), and a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1982), prohibiting the use of a firearm to
commit a felony. A multiple punishment issue was created by the imposition of consecutive
sentences for these two offenses. The Court applied the rule of lenity and thus did not have to
deal with any constitutional questions that might be raised by the Blockburger test. The rule of
lenity was appropriate, according to the Court, because (1) a statement on the floor of the House
by the sponsor of§ 924(c) indicated that it did not apply to the armed robbery statute, 435 U.S. at
13-14; and (2) the House version of the felony firearm bill was adopted by the Congress instead of
the Senate version that would have permitted such cumulative penalties, id at 14.
The Court admitted that the legislative history of § 924(c) was "sparse" but argued that "what
there is . . .points in the direction of a congressional view that the section was intended to be
unavailable in prosecutions for violations of § 2113(d)." 435 U.S. at 15. Thus, the existence of
slight indications of congressional intent not to impose cumulative penalties will trigger the rule of
lenity, at least where, as in Simpson, "the Government is able to prove violations of two separate
criminal statutes with precisely the same factual showing .. " Id at 11.
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duct, the Court's view has been that "the ambiguity should be resolved
in favor of lenity,"' 139 thereby permitting only a single penalty.14
The rule of lenity would obviously not apply when legislative intent
to authorize multiple penalties is clearly stated; thus, the rule is unaf-
fected by Hunter and remains a limitation on the legislature. But the
scope of the rule of lenity is unclear at present. It has been applied by
the Court only in federal cases, 14 1 allowing an inference that the rule
may be one of statutory construction rather than an integral part of the
double jeopardy clause.' 42 Thus, although the rule of lenity survives
Hunter, it may not be accurate to say that it is a double jeopardy
limitation.
The third limitation, although conceptually related to the rule of len-
ity, is more clearly a function of the double jeopardy clause. The Court
has stated or implied in several cases that multiple penalties for the
same conduct must be authorized by the legislature before they can be
constitutionally imposed. 43 The imposition of a penalty that is not au-
thorized by the legislature would violate the multiple punishment doc-
trine as articulated by Ex parte Lange' 44 and North Carolina v.
Pearce .4  It therefore follows that the requirement of legislative au-
139. Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 83 (1955).
140 The issue of what constitutes a single penalty is deceptively complex. It has not been
resolved by the Supreme Court. See infra notes 190-97 and accompanying text.
141. See, e.g.. Simpson v. United States, 435 U.S. 6 (1978); United States v. Gaddis, 424 U.S.
544 (1976); Milanovich v. United States, 365 U.S. 551 (1961); Heflin v. United States, 358 U.S. 415
(1959); Ladner v. United States, 358 U.S. 169 (1958); Prince v. United States, 352 U.S. 322 (1957);
Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81 (1955); United States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S.
218 (1952). Cf. Missouri v. Hunter, 103 S. Ct. 673, 679 (1983) ("Thus far, we have utilized that
rule [of statutory construction] only to limit a federal court's power to impose convictions and
punishments when the will of Congress is not clear.").
142. Cf Westen, supra note 2, at 1029 n.84 (arguing that there is authority that the rule of
lenity -also operates as a constitutional canon of construction"). The difficulty with Professor
Westen's argument is that it is premised on questionable assumptions. See infra text accompany-
ng notes 166-89.
143. Hunter. 103 S.Ct. at 678 (the double jeopardy clause "prevent[s] the sentencing court
from prescribing greater punishment than the legislature intended"); Albernaz, 450 U.S. at 344
("Jwlhere Congress intended ... to impose multiple punishments, imposition of such sentences
does not violate the Constitution") (footnote omitted); Whalen, 445 U.S. at 689 ("imposing multi-
ple punishments not authorized by Congress. . .violates not only the specific guarantee against
double jeopardy, but also the constitutional principle of separation of powers"); Brown, 432 U.S.
at 165 ("once the legislature has acted courts may not impose more than one punishment for the
same offense").
144, See supra text accompanying notes 33-43.
145 See supra text accompanying notes 44-55.
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thorization is a function of the multiple punishment doctrine and thus
of the double jeopardy clause itself.
It might appear that the third limitation is coextensive with the rule
of lenity. The two are, indeed, substantially congruous. Both require
authorization of multiple penalties. Beyond that, though, the rule of
lenity operates as a presumption that resolves ambiguity against the
imposition of multiple penalties. It is not known whether the constitu-
tional requirement of legislative authorization would operate in that
manner. Moreover, the constitutional requirement might be satisfied
with less clear indications of legislative authorization.
Whalen, for example, suggests in a footnote that "[t]he Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. . .would presumably prohibit
state courts from depriving persons of liberty or property as punish-
ment for criminal conduct except to the extent authorized by state
law."' 46 Hunter indicates that this limitation on the legislature is
rooted in the double jeopardy clause rather than the due process clause:
"With respect to cumulative sentences imposed in a single trial, the
Double Jeopardy Clause does no more than prevent the sentencing
court from prescribing greater punishment than the legislature in-
tended."' 47 This standard appears different from the rule of lenity pre-
sumption that the Court has applied in federal cases.
Although the scope of the limitations imposed by the double jeop-
ardy clause on the legislature after Hunter is somewhat unclear, it is
evident that limitations still exist, and the state court was incorrect in
suggesting that a ruling contrary to its Sours holding would make the
clause inapplicable to the legislative branch of government. Having
made clear that it was not immunizing legislative action from the limi-
tations of the double jeopardy clause, the Court in Hunter went on to
hold that it meant what it said in Whalen and Albernaz. The Block-
burger same offense test operates in the context of a single proceeding
as a rule of statutory construction. A "clear indication of contrary leg-
islative intent"'' 48 would therefore make reference to the Blockburger
test unnecessary.
Thus, the double jeopardy clause would not preclude multiple penal-
ties for two offenses that are the same offense if the legislature has spe-
cifically authorized the penalties. In that situation, the punishments
146. Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 690 n.4 (1980).
147. 103 S. Ct. at 678.
148. Id (emphasis deleted) (quoting Albernaz, 450 U.S. at 340).
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imposed for the offenses are not multiple. At least in the context of the
double jeopardy clause, "[1]egislatures, not courts, prescribe the scope
of punishments." 1
49
The conclusion in Hunter is very clear.
Where, as here, a legislature specifically authorizes cumulative punish-
ment under two statutes, regardless of whether those two statutes pro-
scribe the "same" conduct under Blockburger, a court's task of statutory
construction is at an end and the prosecutor may seek and the trial court
or jury may impose cumulative punishment under such statutes in a sin-
gle trial.'5°
Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Stevens, offered an interesting
theory in dissent. Declaring that the phrase "same offense" should not
"be interpreted to mean one thing for purposes of the prohibition
against multiple prosecutions and something else for purposes of the
prohibition against multiple punishment,"'' Marshall argued that a
defendant facing multiple charges "is 'put in jeopardy' as to each
charge."' 52 In the dissent's view, double jeopardy exists if a defendant
is charged in a single trial with two offenses that are the same offense
under the Blockburger test."' Double jeopardy is not, therefore, sy-
nonymous with "repeated attempts to convict an individual for an al-
leged offense,"' 54 but is, rather, a protection against repetitious and
overlapping charges, regardless of whether they are brought in one pro-
ceeding or in successive trials. 55
Justice Marshall stated three arguments in support of his position.
First, he argued that otherwise "there would be no limit to the number
of convictions that a State could obtain on the basis of the same act,
state of mind, and result."' 56 Second, bringing multiple charges "in-
creases the risk that the defendant will be convicted on one or more of
those charges."' 57  Third, multiple criminal convictions have conse-
quences beyond the sentence that is imposed. For instance, "[t]he
149. Id at 679.
150. Id
151. Id at 680 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
152. id at 681 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
153. Id at 682 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
154. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957) (holding repeated attempts to convict for
a single offense double jeopardy).
155. 103 S. Ct. at 680 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
156. Id at 680 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
157. Id at 681 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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number of convictions is often critical to the collateral consequences
that an individual faces."' 58 Each criminal conviction "constitutes a
formal judgment of condemnation by the community" that "imposes
an additional stigma and causes additional damage to the defendant's
reputation."'' 59 Thus, the dissent concluded, "[t]he greater the number
of possible convictions, the greater the risk that the defendant faces.
The defendant is 'put in jeopardy' with respect to each charge against
him.' , 6 0
The conflict between the dissent and the majority opinion in Hunter
mirrors the conflict between the Missouri Supreme Court and a major-
ity of the United States Supreme Court. One view is that punishments
imposed in a single proceeding can never be multiple if the legislature
has authorized them, and thus clearly authorized multiple penalties
cannot be multiple punishment for the same offense. The other view is
that the double jeopardy clause will not permit the legislature to au-
thorize more than a single conviction for the same offense.
Under the view of the dissent in Hunter, only one type of same of-
fense analysis is necessary because the analysis is the same whether it
arises in the context of a single proceeding or of successive prosecu-
tions. Under the view of the Hunter majority, a different type of analy-
sis must be applied in multiple punishment cases.
V. MULTIPLE PUNISHMENT ANALYSIS AFTER HUNTER
The Supreme Court multiple punishment cases, read in light of
Hunter, offer a coherent, workable framework for analyzing multiple
punishment cases in federal court. It is less clear how the framework
applies to state multiple punishment cases because Hunter is the first
Supreme Court multiple punishment case that arose in state court. The
framework for resolving the issue at the federal level will be presented,
and its application to state cases will be discussed. The issue of what
penalties trigger the multiple punishment doctrine will then be
considered.
A. The Issue in Federal Court
When a defendant claims that penalties imposed under different fed-
158. Id (Marshall, J., dissenting).
159. Id at 681-82 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
160. Id at 682 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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eral statutes constitute multiple punishment, a court must first ascertain
whether Congress has clearly expressed its intent regarding the imposi-
tion of separate penalties for violations arising out of the same conduct.
This expression of intent could be either to authorize multiple penalties
or to prohibit them, but in either situation the clear expression of con-
gressional intent controls the constitutional multiple punishment ques-
tion. Hunter has settled this much.
If no clear statement of legislative intent exists, three possibilities
present themselves. First, there might be implicit indications of con-
gressional intent that only a single penalty is authorized. Because of
the established rule that "ambiguity concerning the ambit of criminal
statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity,"'' implicit indications of
congressional intent to authorize only one penalty should be sufficient
to resolve the issue in favor of the defendant.' 62
Second, there might exist implicit indications of an intent to author-
ize multiple penalties. The Hunter rule should be inapplicable in this
situation because it is based on explicit legislative intent to authorize
multiple penalties. If the intent is less than explicit, the possibility ex-
ists that Congress did not, in fact, intend that result. Thus, when the
congressional intention to authorize multiple penalties is not explicit,
some other tool of statutory construction should be utilized to reduce
the likelihood that unauthorized multiple penalties are being
imposed. 163
The final possibility is that no indication of congressional intent ex-
ists with respect to the issue of multiple versus single penalties for con-
duct that violates the criminal statutes in question. In this situation, it
is obvious that another analytical tool is necessary.
Albernaz teaches that this additional analytical tool is the Block-
burger test-whether each statute requires proof of a fact not required
by the other. Although Albernaz and Hunter reduce the Blockburger
161. Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 695 n.10 (1980) (quoting United States v. Bass,
404 U.S. 336, 347 (1971)). Bass, in turn, quoted Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971).
Neither Bass nor Rewis was a multiple punishment case; both were concerned, as the quotation
indicates, with the ambit of a particular statute. Both adopted a narrow construction of the statute
in question because of uncertainty about congressional intent. See supra text accompanying notes
136-42.
162. See supra note 138.
163. See. e.g., Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 83 (1955) ("It may fairly be said to be a
presupposition of our law to resolve doubts in the enforcement of a penal code against the imposi-
tion of a harsher punishment.").
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test to a rule of statutory construction in the context of multiple punish-
ment analysis, it remains an important analytical tool.
The Blockburger test should, therefore, be applied when expressions
of relevant congressional intent provide no answer or when they im-
plicitly indicate an authorization of cumulative penalties. In all other
situations, explicit legislative intent or implicit intent coupled with the
rule of lenity should make the Blockburger test unnecessary.
When Blockburger is applied, Albernaz states that the result of the
test creates a presumption concerning legislative intent.1 64 Theoreti-
cally, this presumption can be overcome by a "clear indication of con-
trary legislative intent."' 65 Practically, however, the analysis employed
in Hunter, and most of the Court's other multiple punishment cases,
makes this possibility unlikely. The Court first seeks a clear indication
of legislative intent concerning cumulative penalties, and it is only
when no such indication is found that it resorts to the Blockburger test.
Thus, it is unlikely, given this approach, that "a clear indication of con-
trary legislative intent" will be found to rebut the Blockburger test.
The Blockburger test is used as an alternative to a clear statement of
legislative intent, and therefore its result would appear to end the mul-
tiple punishment inquiry.
B. The State Multifle Punishment Issue
Three of the multiple punishment categories surveyed in the last sec-
tion are resolved by reference to legislative intent--explicit legislative
intent to authorize multiple penalties, explicit legislative intent to for-
bid multiple penalties, and implicit intent to impose but a single pen-
alty. In the first two categories, the express legislative intent solves the
multiple punishment question; in the last category, the rule of lenity
resolves the ambiguity in favor of the defendant.
When this framework is applied to cases arising in state court, two
difficult issues present themselves. First, is the rule of lenity part of the
multiple punishment doctrine and thus binding on the states through
the double jeopardy clause? Second, to what extent, if any, is a state
court determination of relevant legislative intent reviewable in federal
court?
164. 450 U.S. at 340.
165. Missouri v. Hunter, 103 S. Ct. 673, 678 (1983) (emphasis deleted) (quoting Albernaz v.
United States, 450 U.S. 333, 340 (1981)).
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The Supreme Court has never intimated that the rule of lenity is
binding on the states, nor has it suggested that federal courts have the
authority to review a state court's determination of legislative intent
with respect to the multiple punishment issue. Professor Westen ar-
gues, however, that the rule of lenity is part of "the more general prin-
ciple that no one should be criminally punished except for conduct
clearly prohibited by the domestic law." 166 This general principle leads
to the conclusion that "with respect to the interpretation of criminal
statutes, the Constitution precludes a court from accepting a lower
court's interpretation at face value and requires, instead, that the court
proceed with caution lest it punish a person whom the legislature did
not intend to punish."' 67 Stated more specifically, "a federal court is
not bound by a state court's determination as to the clarity of the state
legislature's intention to impose multiple punishment."' 68
The difficulty with Professor Westen's argument is that it is premised
on three weak inferences from Whalen and a questionable analogy to
the void-for-vagueness doctrine. Westen's first inference from Whalen
regards what the Court might have meant when it cited Bell v. United
States'69 for the proposition that legislative intent plays an important
role in multiple punishment analysis: "The citation to Bell may be sig-
nificant because. . . it was the case in which the Court first announced
the rule of 'lenity'. "170 Whalen cited seven other cases along with Bell
for the same proposition, however. "' Read in context, the Bell citation
does not appear to be for the rule of lenity but simply for the general
proposition that the first step in multiple punishment analysis is to as-
166. Westen, supra note 2, at 1029 (footnote omitted). See also Note, The Voidfor Vagueness
Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 67, 82-83 n.79 (1969); Twice in Jeopardy, supra
note 29, at 318 n.273.
167. Westen, supra note 2, at 1029 n.84.
168. Id at 1027 n.81 (emphasis in original).
169. 349 U.S. 81 (1955).
170. Westen, supra note 2, at 1029 n.84 (emphasis in original).
171. The citation appears in context as follows:
But the question whether punishments imposed by a court after a defendant's conviction
upon criminal charges are unconstitutionally multiple cannot be resolved without deter-
mining what punishments the Legislative Branch has authorized. See Gore v. United
States. 357 U.S. 386, 390; id, at 394 (Warren, C.J., dissenting on statutory grounds); Bell
v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 82; Ex parte Lange, 18 Wall. 163, 176; see also Brown v.
Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165; United States v. Universal CLT Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218;
Blockburger Y. United States, 284 U.S. 299; Ebeling v. Morgan, 237 U.S. 625.
445 U.S. at 688.
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certain relevant legislative intent. 172
The other two parts of Westen's lWhalen argument have at their core
the Whalen Court's refusal to defer to the statutory construction of the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals. 7 3 Westen reads this refusal to
imply "that with respect to the interpretation of criminal statutes, the
Constitution precludes a court from accepting a lower court's interpre-
tation at face value."' 17
4
As the Wfhalen Court noted, however, the deference to the statutory
construction of the District of Columbia courts is "a matter of judicial
policy, not a matter of judicial power."'' 7 5  Whether federal courts
should reinterpret state statutes that have been construed by state ap-
pellate courts is, on the other hand, a question of judicial power.' 76
That the Court refused to defer to the statutory construction of the Dis-
trict of Columbia courts in Whalen does not answer the question
whether it would refuse to defer to the interpretation of a state statute
by a state court. Thus, it seems unjustified to read TWhalen as implying
that "a federal court is not bound by a state court's determination as to
the clarity of the state legislature's intention to impose multiple
punishment."' 77
Westen further seeks to justify federal review of state multiple pun-
ishment cases by arguing that the multiple punishment doctrine "corre-
sponds with comparable values underlying the constitutional
prohibition of vague criminal statutes."17 8 He argues that the void-for-
vagueness cases may be divided into two categories, with the second
category being "cases in which notice is immaterial, but in which stat-
utes are too vague to give executive officials guidance as to what the
172. Three of the cited cases actually upheld multiple penalties based on the same conduct
(Gore, Blockburger, and Ebeling).
173. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals had held the offenses separate, finding "that
'nothing in th[e] legislation. . . suggest[s] that Congress intended' the two offenses to merge." 445
U.S. at 687 (quoting Whalen v. United States, 379 A.2d 1152, 1159 (D.C. 1977)).
174. Westen, supra note 2, at 1029 n.84.
175. 445 U.S. at 687.
176. "Acts of Congress affecting only the District, like other federal laws, certainly come
within this Court's Art. III jurisdiction, and thus we are not prevented from reviewing the deci-
sions of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals interpreting those Acts in the same jurisdic-
tional sense that we are barred from reviewing a state court's interpretation of a state statute." Id,
at 687-88.
177. Westen, supra note 2, at 1027 n.81 (emphasis in original).
178. Id at 1027-28 (footnote omitted).
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legislature intended."' 7 9 Thus, the "real gravamen" of these cases is
that "prosecutors and courts will punish persons whom the legislature
may not have clearly intended to punish."'180 Westen concludes that
"[tlhis is the same constitutional principle that underlies the prohibition
on multiple punishment."' 8'1
One problem with this analogy is that it is not easy to separate void-
for-vagueness cases into those in which lack of notice of prohibited
conduct is important and those in which it is not important. The
Supreme Court has typically stated that an unconstitutionally vague
statute is void not only because it allows too much discretion for police
and prosecutors, but also because it fails to give citizens the requisite
notice of the prohibited conduct.'82
Further, a statute that is vague with respect to the prohibited conduct
will, by definition, both fail to give notice and allow too much discre-
tion. 1' These evils are necessarily intertwined when the parameters of
179. Id at 1028 n.83. The first category, of course, is composed of cases in which "statutes are
too vague to give persons notice of the kinds of conduct that are prohibited." Id
180. Id
181. Id
182. See. e.g., Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 168 (1972) ("Another aspect of the
ordinance's vagueness appears when we focus, not on the lack of notice given a potential offender,
but on the effect of the unfettered discretion it places in the hands of the Jacksonville police.").
183. If the statute defines the prohibited conduct in an imprecise manner, it would allow too
much discretion for police and prosecutors to apply it as they please. But the very imprecision of
the definition of prohibited conduct would also create a constitutional lack of notice problem.
Nor is Kolender v. Lawson, 103 S. Ct. 1855 (1983), to the contrary. Although the Court's opin-
ion in Kolender focuses on the arbitrary enforcement evil presented by the California stop-and-
identify statute, id at 1858, the statute also suffers from the defect of lack of notice of prohibited
conduct. As construed by the California Court of Appeals, the statute applied to conduct that
gave a police officer "reasonable suspicion of criminal activity sufficient to justify a Terry deten-
tion." Id at 1857-58.
This limiting construction by the state court certainly provides very little notice to the average
citizen as to what conduct is prohibited. The statutory language itself is equally vague as to the
parameters of the prohibited conduct:
Every person who commits any of the following acts is guilty of disorderly conduct, a
misdemeanor: . . . (e) Who loiters or wanders upon the streets or from place to place
without apparent reason or business and who refuses to identify himself and to account
for his presence when requested by any peace officer to do so, if the surrounding circum-
stances are such as to indicate to a reasonable man that the public safety demands such
identification.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 647 (Deering 1984).
Thus, the statute struck down in Kolender is another example of a vague law in which the evils
of lack of notice and arbitrary enforcement are intertwined. That the Court focused on the latter
problem in its analysis by no means indicates that the former is not also present.
One commentator who shares Westen's view that "[t]he vagueness doctrine is analogous to the
rule of strict construction," implies strongly that the vagueness doctrine has, at its theoretical core,
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the prohibited conduct are unclear. A statute that provides the neces-
sary notice will allow too much discretion only when the definition of
the prohibited conduct is clear but the penalty provision is not. Westen
cites one such case in support of his argument: United States v. Ev-
ans.184 Evans is, however, a case that interprets federal law and thus
can be explained by the general principle that "ambiguity concerning
the ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity."' 185
As Evans is, in reality, a federal rule of lenity case, it does not require a
separate category of void-for-vagueness cases to explain its result.
The conclusion that the vagueness issues of lack of notice and too
much discretion are not easily separable is detrimental to Westen's de-
termination that the multiple punishment doctrine is simply an exten-
sion of the void-for-vagueness principle. If lack of notice is an integral
part of the vagueness doctrine, as it appears to be, the doctrine per-
forms a function different from, and arguably more important than, the
multiple punishment doctrine. The offense to the notion of fairness
and due process is of a higher order when a person is subjected to crim-
inal sanction for conduct not thought to be criminal than when a per-
son is subjected to an additional, albeit unintended, penalty for
conduct known to be criminal. In the former situation, the law is mak-
ing a criminal out of a person who lacks knowledge that his conduct is
wrongful. 186 In the latter situation, the law is simply imposing a har-
sher penalty than the legislature intended for conduct that is unques-
tionably wrongful.
Thus, the willingness of the Supreme Court to require federal judi-
cial review of vagueness challenges to state laws can be justified by the
higher degree of injury posed by vague laws. That the Court is willing
to review state vagueness decisions does not, however, necessarily por-
tend the same willingness to review state court determinations of legis-
lative intent in the context of multiple punishment challenges.
A further difficulty with Westen's argument is the nature of the con-
stitutional rights involved. The vagueness doctrine operates indepen-
both the fair warning rationale and the "aim of preventing arbitrary governmental action." Tiyce
in Jeopardy, supra note 29, at 318 n.273.
184. 333 U.S. 483 (1948).
185. See supra note 161. Indeed, Evans explicitly states that "[t]he case presents an unusual
and difficult problem in statutory construction." 333 U.S. at 484.
186. Cf. Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957) (requiring proof that the defendant had
actual knowledge of the registration ordinance in question before a conviction thereunder would
comport with due process).
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dently of, and perhaps contrary to, legislative intent; the analysis in no
way depends on what the legislature intended. Multiple punishment,
however, can occur only when the penalty in question is not authorized
by the legislature.187 Thus, the multiple punishment analysis is inevita-
bly linked with legislative intent. It is more difficult to justify federal
review of state cases based exclusively on state legislative intent than it
is to justify review of state cases interpreting a doctrine, such as vague-
ness, that has significance wholly independent of legislative intent.
Stated another way, a vague law is unconstitutionally vague regard-
less of the intent of the state legislature and thus would be constitution-
ally infirm in any state. Application of multiple penalties under two
statutes might be constitutional under the multiple punishment doc-
trine in one state-because of express legislative intent-and unconsti-
tutional in another state-because of lack of express intent.
Determining that the multiple punishment doctrine can theoretically
produce a different result from state to state depending on the intent of
the legislature is the best argument for allowing the state courts to be
the final interpreters of state legislative intent.
Westen's position would require federal courts to reexamine the in-
tent of the state legislature in any case questioning whether the defend-
ant was being punished in excess of what the legislature intended. But
how can a state supreme court misinterpret its own state law? As Jus-
tice Rehnquist wrote in his Whalen dissent,
[t]o the extent that the Court implies that a state court can ever err in the
interpretation of its own law and that such an error would create a federal
question reviewable by this Court, I believe it clearly wrong. For the
question in such cases is not whether the lower court "misread" the rele-
vant statutes or its own common law, but rather who does the reading in
the first place. 188
Although it is certainly correct to conclude, as Westen does, that the
double jeopardy clause forbids punishment in excess of what the legis-
lature intended, it does not therefore follow that the federal courts
should be the ultimate interpreters of state legislative intent. There is
much to commend Justice Rehnquist's conclusion that state courts
should have the final say in making that interpretation. First, it repre-
187 The issue of authorization of multiple penalties encompasses the rule of lenity and other
tools of statutory construction (such as the Blockburger test). See supra text accompanying notes
161-65.
188. 445 U.S. at 706-07 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
Number 1]
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
sents an allocation of judicial power between federal and state courts
that is sensitive to the independent status of state courts. Second, state
courts should be in a better position to interpret the intent of their own
state legislature. Third, it is the most efficient allocation of judicial re-
sponsibility. To have federal courts sitting in judgment of the legisla-
tive intent of fifty state legislatures is a cumbersome method of
implementing the multiple punishment doctrine.
Although Missouri v. Hunter does not resolve this scope of review
issue, it does contain dictum that can be construed as accepting Rehn-
quist's position and repudiating Westen's position:
Here, the Missouri Supreme court has construed the two statutes at
issue as defining the same crime. In addition, the Missouri Supreme
Court has recognized that the legislature intended that punishment for
violations of the statutes be cumulative. We are bound to accept the Mis-
souri court's construction of that State's statutes.1 89
C. The Concurrent Sentence Issue
Another unresolved multiple punishment issue is the determination
of when the nature of the penalties renders them multiple. Clearly,
consecutive sentences would constitute multiple punishments,' as
would a fine that totals more than could be imposed under either stat-
ute.191 But what about concurrent sentences? The Court has, on one
occasion, refused to reach a multiple punishment claim when concur-
rent sentences were imposed and the defendant was "not eligible for
parole at any time."' 92
It is open to question whether the same result would be reached if
the existence of the second conviction and the concurrent sentences cre-
ates the possibility of adverse collateral consequences. As the purpose
of the multiple punishment doctrine is to prevent a penalty beyond that
189. 103 S. Ct. at 679 (emphasis added).
190. See Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 685 (1980); Heflin v. United States, 358 U.S.
415, 416 (1959); Prince v. United States, 352 U.S. 322, 324 (1957).
191. Jeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137, 157-58 (1977).
192. Id at 155 n.24. The defendant inJeffers was sentenced to life in prison without possibil-
ity of parole on one of the convictions, id at 145, and received a 15 year prison sentence for
another offense, id at 143. The Court held that Congress did not "intend to impose cumulative
penalties" under the two statutes in question, id at 157, but did not reach the issue of whether
concurrent prison sentences were cumulative penalties. "For present purposes, since petitioner is
not eligible for parole at any time, there is no need to examine the Government's argument that
the prison sentences do not present any possibility of cumulative punishment." Id at 155 n.24.
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authorized by the legislature,' 93 it would seem that any adverse conse-
quences that attend the second conviction would be unauthorized if the
legislature intended only one penalty for the conduct in question. If
adverse collateral consequences are multiple punishment, then the po-
tential for adverse collateral consequences must also be considered
multiple punishment because there would be no mechanism to redress
these consequences should they occur years later.
The whole problem of identifying when the nature of punishments is
multiple would be avoided if the multiple punishment doctrine were
held to bar multiple convictions for the same offense without regard to
the type of penalty imposed. Many state courts have so held.'94 In
United States v. Gaddis,195 the United States Supreme Court appears to
have reached the same conclusion. 196 Furthermore, it is interesting to
193. See supra notes 33-55 and accompanying text.
194. See, e.g., Wilkerson v. State, 41 Ala. App. 265, 130 So. 2d 348, cert. denied 272 Ala. 710,
130 So. 2d 350 (1961); Tuckfield v. State, 621 P.2d 1350 (Alaska 1981); People v. Raymer, 626 P.2d
705 (Colo. App. 1980), aft'd, 662 P.2d 1066 (Colo. 1983); State v. Pinder, 375 So. 2d 836 (Fla.
1979); Burke v. State, 234 Ga. 512, 216 S.E.2d 812 (1975); Rogers v. State, 272 Ind. 65, 396 N.E.2d
348 (1979); State v. Dorsey, 224 Kan. 152, 578 P.2d 261 (1978); State v. Doughty, 379 So. 2d 1088
(La. 1980); Newton v. State, 280 Md. 260, 373 A.2d 262 (1977); Commonwealth v. Jones, 416
N.E.2d 502 (Mass. 1981); People v. Wilder, 411 Mich. 328, 308 N.W.2d 112 (1981); State v. Hen-
derson, 620 S.W.2d 484 (Tenn. 1981).
Cf. . Definition of Punishment, supra note 29, at 649-51 (concluding that probation and precon-
viction confinement should be defined as punishment for purposes of the prohibition against mul-
tiple punishment).
195. 424 U.S. 544 (1976).
196. The defendants in Gaddis were convicted of four different offenses based on a single bank
robbery: entry with intent to rob, robbery, possession of the proceeds of a bank robbery, and
assault with a dangerous weapon during a bank robbery. 18 U.S.C. § 2113 (1982). The Court
determined that Congress did not intend multiple penalties for these offenses when they are com-
mitted m the course of a single bank robbery. 424 U.S. at 547-48. The Court ordered the convic-
tions and sentences for the possession of proceeds offense vacated, id at 549, and stated that the
concurrent sentences for the offenses of entry and robbery "should also be vacated," id at n.12,
thus leaving a single sentence for assault with a dangerous weapon during a bank robbery. That
the Court did not mention vacating the convictions for the offenses of entry and robbery might be
significant because the Court had drawn a distinction of sorts between these offenses and posses-
sion of the proceeds of the robbery. The possession offense "is simply not a lesser included offense
within the total framework of the bank robbery provisions of § 2113." Id at 548. Instead, it
"reaches a different 'group of wrongdoers, Le., 'those who receive loot from the robber.'" Id
(quoting Heftin v. United States, 358 U.S. 415, 419-20 (1959)).
Thus, with respect to the possession of proceeds offense, the Court seems to be saying that proof
of robbery will never prove possession of the proceeds and vice versa. Convictions for these of-
fenses are, therefore, mutually exclusive, and it would be illogical to permit convictions for both to
stand, irrespective of any multiple penalty problem.
The other offenses are, however, a species of lesser included offense of the offense of assault
with a dangerous weapon during a bank robbery. Proof of the assault offense inevitably proves
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bank robbery, and thus the latter is a necessarily included offense of the former. See Illinois v.
Vitale, 447 U.S. 410, 419 (1980) (if proof of one offense "is always a necessary element of" the
other offense, the two offenses "are the 'same' under Blockburger"). Entry with intent to rob
presents a somewhat more complicated problem. As one commentator correctly noted, "Inas-
much as a person may formulate the intent to commit robbery after entering a bank with felonious
intent, entry with felonious intent is not necessarily included in robbery." Note, The Federal Bank
Robbery4ct-The Problem Of Separatel Punishable Offenses, 18 WM. & MARY L. REv. 101, 111
(1976). Despite this "theoretical possibility" of non-inclusion, see Hunter, 103 S. Ct. at 680 n.2
(Marshall, J., dissenting), the Supreme Court has clearly held that entry with intent to rob is a
lesser offense of the robbery offenses in the Bank Robbery Act. Gaddis, 424 U.S. at 547; Prince v.
United States, 352 U.S. 322, 329 (1957). Thus, whether entry with intent to rob is a necessarily
included offense under the Vitale test, it is a lesser offense for purposes of the double jeopardy
clause when it is proved by proof of a robbery offense.
Given this conclusion, it would not be illogical to permit convictions for all offenses proven in a
single trial (greater and lesser) in the same way that it is illogical to permit convictions for mutu-
ally exclusive offenses. The single problem in the greater-lesser context would be to prevent multi-
ple punishment, and it may be argued that this may be accomplished without vacating the
multiple convictions. Some courts, for example, have satisfied the multiple punishment prohibi-
tion by ordering consecutive sentences to be served concurrently. See Note, Double Jeopard.
Multple Prosecution, and Mulltple Punishment: A Comparative Analysis, 50 CAL. L. REv. 853, 860
(1962); Note, Double Jeopardy v. Double Punishment-Confusion in California, 2 SAN DIEao L.
Rav. 86, 97 (1965); Twice In Jeopardy, supra note 29 at 299-300 n.161.
Another approach to the multiple punishment problem that would leave the convictions intact
would be to vacate the sentences (but not the convictions) for the lesser sentences. A variation of
this approach was advocated in United States v. Corson, 449 F.2d 544 (3d Cir. 1971). The Third
Circuit decided that Prince would be satisfied if a general sentence for a term not exceeding the
penalty for the greater offense were imposed for all counts under the Bank Robbery Act, Id at
551. But see, e.g., United States v. Vaughn, 598 F.2d 336, 337 (4th Cir. 1979) (holding that the
conviction and sentence for one of the offenses must be vacated under the authority of Smpson t.
United States,) 435 U.S. 6 (1978); United States v. Roach, 590 F.2d 181, 184 (5th Cir. 1979)
(same); United States v. Stewart, 579 F.2d 356, 359-60 (5th Cir. 1978) (same); United States v.
Nelson, 574 F.2d 277, 283 (5th Cir. 1978) (same).
The Vaughn-Roach approach seems consistent with the Supreme Court's own interpretation of
what it did in Gaddis. In Jeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137, 155 n.25 (1977), the Court stated
that Gaddis had vacated both the sentence and the conviction for the offense of entry with intent to
rob.
Gaddis may indeed be read in this manner. The Court in Gaddis indicated at one point that
there was "in the present case a 'merger' of the convictions" for robbery, entry with intent to rob,
and assaulting victims during the robbery. 424 U.S. at 547. The doctrine of merger at common
law "is ordinarily understood to have meant that if an act resulted in both a misdemeanor and a
felony the former was so completely merged in the latter as to be unrecognizable for any legal
purpose." R. PERKINS & R. BoycE, CRIMINAL LAW 616 (3d ed. 1982).
The Court in Gaddis is clearly not referring to this type of merger. Rather, the Court seems to
be saying that a conviction for a lesser included offense merges into the conviction for the greater
offense. If two convictions merge into one, however, it would appear logical to vacate one of the
convictions. Thus, Gaddis would seem to be authority for the proposition that the proper remedy
in a multiple punishment case is to vacate the conviction as well as the sentence for the lesser
offense.
The Supreme Court has not, however, explicitly analyzed the question. In fact, in a case de-
cided after Gaddis, the Court acted as if it had reserved the question. See Jeffers v. United States,
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note that Hunter itself involved concurrent sentences, 197 and the Court
made no mention of this fact in its multiple punishment analysis. If the
concurrent nature of the sentences somehow avoided the multiple pun-
ishment problem, the Hunter Court could have decided the case on that
basis, or at least used that rationale as an additional basis for the deci-
sion. Thus, it may be inferred from Gaddis and Hunter that concurrent
sentences are considered multiple punishments.
VI. CONCLUSION
Although Missouri v. Hunter leaves the concurrent sentence issue
and the scope of federal review issue essentially undecided, it certainly
performs a valuable service in clearly identifying the theoretical basis
of the multiple punishment doctrine. One need no longer puzzle over
why the double jeopardy clause applies at all in the context of single
proceedings.' 98 By telling us that the clause applies to prevent the im-
position of a greater punishment than that authorized by the legisla-
ture, the Court has provided the key to the puzzle.
Ex parte Lange held that a judge may not impose a sentence if an
earlier sentence under the same judgment of conviction has been fully
executed because the double jeopardy clause would otherwise be of no
avail. If the double jeopardy clause forbids two sentences based on a
single conviction, it should likewise forbid two sentences for two con-
victions when the legislature intended only one sentence be imposed.
In both situations, the judge is punishing the defendant in excess of the
legislative authorization, and this is double jeopardy because "[it is the
punishment that would legally follow the second conviction [for the
same offense] which is the real danger guarded against by the
Constitution." 199
432 U.S. 137 (1977). In Jeffers, the Court noted that the defendant was "not eligible for parole at
any time," thus rendering it unnecessary to "examine the Government's argument that the prison
sentences do not present any possibility of cumulative punishment." 432 U.S. at 155 n.24. In the
very next footnote, however, the Court stated that it had, in Gaddis, vacated the "convictions and
sentences under U.S.C. § 2113(a) in light of conviction under § 2113(d)." Id at n.25 (emphasis
added).
197. Missouri v. Hunter, 103 S. Ct. 673, 676 (1983).
198. See, e.g., Craig, Double Jeopardy and Cumulative Sentencing In the Military, 48 GEo. L.J.
43, 63 (1959) ("From the point of view of semantics it is difficult to show a defendant to be twice in
jeopardy from a multiple-count indictment or multiple charges, although in fact he may be ex-
posed to double punishment when he receives a sentence twice as severe as was intended by
Congress.").
199. Exparte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 173 (1873).
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To suggest that the legislature can authorize multiple convictions
and cumulative penalties in a single proceeding for what is the "same
offense" under the Blockburger test seems, at first blush, an incredible
proposition, and Justice Marshall's dissent in Hunter is therefore ap-
pealing. After all, no other constitutional guarantee is defined by legis-
lative fiat. Upon reflection, however, it becomes apparent that the
Hunter majority is correct.200 This conclusion follows from the deriva-
tive nature of the multiple punishment doctrine. It is not a protection
that is defined by the double jeopardy clause, but one that exists be-
cause it is necessary to keep judges and prosecutors from circumventing
the protection of the double jeopardy clause.20 1
The multiple punishment doctrine, therefore, has served its purpose
when it limits punishment to what is intended by the legislature. No
reason exists, in logic or in the policies underlying the double jeopardy
clause, to extend the doctrine further. Hunter recognized this and, ac-
cordingly, clarified the relationship between the protection against suc-
cessive prosecutions and the protection against multiple punishment.
200. See Craig, supra note 198, at 63 (the criteria for determining the identity of offenses in a
multiple punishment situation may differ from multiple prosecution criteria "since it is the better
view that the fifth amendment double jeopardy provision does not deal with the amount of pun-
ishment flowing from one trial.").
201. A Definition ofPunishment, supra note 29, at 635 (stating that the "multiple punishment
prohibition is a necessary corollary of the double jeopardy clause's retrial restrictions: the bar
against retrying the defendant after conviction would be inadequate if, after a single trial, the
court could impose any number of sentences on the defendant"); see Sours II, 603 S.W.2d at 610
("the Double Jeopardy Clause's historical purpose [is] to protect the defendant from harassment,
relitigation, and judicial usurpation of the legislative authority to punish").
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